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Abstract. We propose a new bi-intuitionistic type theory called Dualized Type The-
ory (DTT). It is a simple type theory with perfect intuitionistic duality, and corresponds
to a single-sided polarized sequent calculus. We prove DTT strongly normalizing, and
prove type preservation. DTT is based on a new propositional bi-intuitionistic logic called
Dualized Intuitionistic Logic (DIL) that builds on Pinto and Uustalu’s logic L. DIL is a
simplification of L by removing several admissible inference rules while maintaining consis-
tency and completeness. Furthermore, DIL is defined using a dualized syntax by labeling
formulas and logical connectives with polarities thus reducing the number of inference rules
needed to define the logic. We give a direct proof of consistency, but prove completeness
by reduction to L.
1. Introduction
The verification of software often requires the mixture of finite and infinite data types. The
former are used to define tree-based structures while the latter are used to define infinite
stream-based structures. An example of a tree-based structure is a list or an AVL tree.
Infinite stream-based structures can be used to verify properties of a software system over
time or to verify liveness properties of the system; see the introduction to [18] for a great
discussion of the use of co-induction to study software systems. An example of an infinite
stream-based structure is an infinitely branching tree, or an infinite list.
Finite tree-based structures can be modeled by inductive data types while infinite
stream-based structures can be modeled by coinductive data types. Thus, tool support
for reasoning about the behavior of a software system must provide both inductive data
types as well as coinductive data types, and allow for their mixture. However, there are
problems with existing systems that do provide both inductive and coinductive data types.
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For example, Agda restricts how inductive and coinductive types can be nested (see the
discussion in [1]), while Coq supports general mixed inductive and coinductive data, but in
doing so, sacrifices type preservation. Therefore, what is the proper logical foundation to
study the relationships between inductive and coinductive data types? By studying such a
foundation we may determine in what ways inductive and coinductive data can be mixed
without sacrificing expressivity or key meta-theoretic properties.
One fairly obvious relationship between inductive and coinductive data types is that
they are duals to each other. We believe that the proper foundation for studying inductive
and coinductive types must be able to express this symmetry while maintaining construc-
tivity. It turns out that a constructive logical foundation may lie in an already known
constructive logic known as bi-intuitionistic logic.
Bi-intuitionistic logic (BINT)1 is a conservative extension [8] of intuitionistic logic with
prefect duality. That is, every logical connective in the logic has a dual. For example, BINT
contains conjunction and disjunction, their units true and false, but also implication and
its dual called co-implication (also known as subtraction, difference, or exclusion).
Co-implication is fairly unknown in computer science, but an intuition of its meaning
can be seen in its interpretation into Kripke models. In [29, 30] Rauszer gives a conserva-
tive extension of the Kripke semantics for intuitionistic logic that models all of the logical
connectives of BINT by introducing a new logical connective for co-implication. The usual
interpretation of implication in a Kripke model is as follows:
JA→ BKw = ∀w
′.w ≤ w′ → JAKw′ → JBKw′
Rauszer took the dual of the previous interpretation to obtain the following:
JA−BKw = ∃w
′.w′ ≤ w ∧ ¬JAKw′ ∧ JBKw′
The previous interpretation shows that implication considers future worlds, while
co-implication considers past worlds.
We consider BINT logic to be the closest extension of intuitionistic logic to classical
logic while maintaining constructivity. BINT has two forms of negation, one defined as
usual, ¬A
def
= A →⊥, and a second defined in terms of co-implication, ∼A
def
= ⊤ − A. The
latter we call “non-A”. Now in BINT it is possible to prove A ∨ ∼A for any A [7]. In
fact, the latter, in a type theoretic setting, corresponds to the type of a constructive control
operator [8].
BINT is a conservative extension of intuitionistic logic, and hence maintains construc-
tivity, but contains a rich notion of symmetry between the logical connectives. Thus, any
extension of a BINT logic must preserve this symmetry, and hence, if we add inductive data
types, then we must also add co-inductive data types. However, all of this is premised on
the ability to define a BINT type theory.
The contributions of this paper are a new formulation of Pinto and Uustalu’s BINT
labeled sequent calculus L called Dualized Intuitionistic Logic (DIL) and a corresponding
type theory called Dualized Type Theory (DTT). DIL is a single-sided polarized formulation
of Pinto and Uustalu’s L, thus, DIL is a propositional bi-intuitionistic logic, and builds on
L by removing the following rules (see Section 3 for a complete definition of L):
1We only consider propositional logic in this paper. Note that first-order BINT is non-conservative over
first-order intuitionistic logic [30, 15], but we believe that second-order BINT is conservative over second-
order intuitionistic logic, but we leave this to future work.
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Γ ⊢G∪{(n,n)} ∆
Γ ⊢G ∆
refl
n1Gn2
n2Gn3
Γ ⊢G∪{(n1,n3)} ∆
Γ ⊢G ∆
trans
nGn ′
Γ,n : T ,n ′ : T ⊢G ∆
Γ,n : T ⊢G ∆
monL
n ′Gn
Γ ⊢G n
′ : T ,n : T ,∆
Γ ⊢G n : T ,∆
monR
We show that in the absence of the previous rules DIL still maintains consistency (Theo-
rem 4.12) and completeness (Theorem 4.43). Furthermore, DIL is defined using a dualized
syntax that reduces the number of inference rules needed to define the logic.
Since DIL has multiple conclusions, and the active formula is on the right, DIL must
have a means of switching out the active formula with another conclusion. This is done in
DIL using cuts on hypotheses. We call these types of cuts “axiom cuts.” These axiom cuts
show up in non-trivial proofs like the proof of the axiom A∨∼A for any A [7]. Furthermore,
when the latter is treated as a type in DTT, the inhabitant is a continuation without a
canonical form, because the inhabitant contains as a subexpression an axiom cut. Thus,
the presence of these continuations prevents the canonicity result for a type theory – like
DTT – from holding. Thus, if general cut elimination was a theorem of DIL, then A ∨ ∼A
would not be provable. So DIL must contain cuts that cannot be eliminated. This implies
that DIL does not enjoy general cut elimination, but all cuts other than axiom cuts can
be eliminated. Throughout the sequel we define “cut elimination” as the elimination of all
cuts other than axiom cuts, and we call DIL “cut free” with respect to this definition of cut
elimination. The latter point is similar to Wadler’s dual calculus [36].
The general form of a DIL sequent is G; Γ ⊢ p A @ n where Γ is a context, multiset of
hypotheses of the form p′ B @ n ′, p is a polarity that can be either + or −, and n is a node
of the abstract Kripke graph G which is a list of edges. Think of G as a list of constraints
on the accessibility relation in the Kripke semantics. The negative hypotheses in Γ are
alternate conclusions. In fact, if we denote by Γp the subcontext of Γ consisting of all the
hypotheses with polarity p, then we can translate a DIL sequent, G; Γ ⊢ p A @ n, into the
more traditional form, where if p = +, then the sequent is equivalent to G; Γ+ ⊢ +A@n,Γ−,
but if p = −, then the sequent is equivalent to G; Γ+,−A@ n ⊢ Γ−.
The polarities provide two main properties of DIL and DTT. The first, which is more
fundamental than the second, is the ability to single out an active formula providing a
single-conclusion perspective of a multi-conclusion logic. This is important if we want to
obtain a type theory in the traditional form: a single term on the right. The second main
property is they provide a means of significantly reducing the number of inference rules that
define the logic. Above we saw that in G; Γ ⊢ +A@ n we think of A as being on the right,
but in G; Γ ⊢ −A@ n we think of A as being on the left, and thus, if we index the logical
operators of DIL with polarities, for example in A ∧p B , we can collapse the left and right
rules into a single rule. For example, A∧+B is conjunction, but A∧−B is disjunction, and
the right-rule for conjunction mirrors the left-rule for disjunction, but we move from the
right to the left, but in DIL this is just a change in polarity. The right-rule for conjunction
and the left-rule for disjunction can thus be given by the single rule:
G; Γ ⊢ p A@ n G; Γ ⊢ p B @ n
G; Γ ⊢ p (A ∧p B) @ n
and
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A summary of our contributions is as follows:
• A new formulation of Pinto and Uustalu’s BINT labeled sequent calculus L called Dualized
Intuitionistic Logic (DIL),
• a corresponding simple type theory called Dualized Type Theory (DTT),
• a computer-checked proof – in Agda – of consistency for DIL with respect to Rauszer’s
Kripke semantics for BINT logic,
• a completeness proof for DIL by reduction to Pinto and Uustalu’s L, and
• the basic metatheory for DTT: type preservation and strong normalization for DTT. We
show the latter using a version of Krivine’s classical realizability by translating DIL into
a classical logic.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We first discuss related work in Section 2.
Then we introduce Pinto and Uustalu’s L calculus in Section 3, and then DIL in Section 4.
We present the consistency proof for DIL in Section 4.1, and then show DIL is complete
(with only axiom cuts) in Section 4.2. Following DIL we introduce DTT in Section 5, and
its metatheory in Section 6. All of the mathematical content of this paper was typeset with
the help of Ott [33].
2. Related Work
The main motivation for studying BINT is to use it to study the mixture of inductive and
co-inductive data types, but from a constructive perspective. However, a natural question
to ask is can classical logic be used? There has been a lot of work done since Griffin’s
seminal paper [14] showing that the type of Peirce’s law corresponds to a control operator,
and thus, providing a means of defining a program from any classical proof; for example see
[27, 31, 9, 36]. Kimura and Tatsuta extend Wadler’s Dual Calculus (DC) with inductive
and coinductive data types in [19]. The Dual Calculus was invented by Wadler [36], and is
a multi-conclusion classical simple type theory based in sequent calculus instead of natural
deduction. DC only contains the logical operators conjunction, disjunction, and negation.
Then he defines the other operators in terms of these. Thus, co-implication is defined, and
not taken as a primitive operator. Kimura and Tatsuta carry out a very similar program to
what we are proposing here. They add inductive and co-inductive types to DC, show that
the rich symmetry of classical logic extends to inductive and co-inductive types, and finally
shows how to embed this extension into the second-order extension of DC. The starkest
difference between their work, and the ultimate goals of our program is that we wish to be
as constructive as possible. We choose to do this, because we ultimately wish to extend
our work to dependent types, which we conjecture will be a goal more easily reached in a
constructive setting versus a classical setting. Extending control operators to dependent
types is currently an open problem; for example, general Σ-types cannot be mixed with
control operators [16].
As we mentioned above BINT logic is fairly unknown in computer science. Crolard
introduced a logic and corresponding type theory called subtractive logic, and showed it
can be used to study constructive coroutines in [7, 8]. He initially defined subtractive logic in
sequent style with the Dragalin restriction, and then defined the corresponding type theory
in natural deduction style by imposing a restriction on Parigot’s λµ-calculus in the form of
complex dependency tracking. Just as linear logicians have found – for example in [32] –
Pinto and Uustalu were able to show that imposing the Dragalin restriction in subtractive
logic results in a failure of cut elimination [28]. They recover cut elimination by proposing a
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new BINT logic called L that lifts the Dragalin restriction by labeling formulas and sequents
with nodes and graphs respectively; this labeling corresponds to placing constraints on
the sequents where the graphs can be seen as abstract Kripke models. Gore´ et al. also
proposed a new BINT logic that enjoys cut elimination using nested sequents; however it is
currently unclear how to define a type theory with nested sequents [13]. Bilinear logic in its
intuitionistic form is a linear version of BINT and has been studied by Lambek in [21, 22].
Biasi and Aschieri propose a term assignment to polarized bi-intuitionistic logic in [6]. One
can view the polarities of their logic as an internalization of the polarities of the logic we
propose in this article. Bellin has studied BINT similar to that of Biasi and Aschieri from a
philosophical perspective in [2, 3, 4], and he defined a linear version of Crolard’s subtractive
logic, for which he was able to construct a categorical model using linear categories in [5].
DIL sequents are labeled with an abstract Kripke graph that is defined as a multiset of
edges between abstract nodes – labels denoted n. Then all formulas in a sequent are labeled
with a node from the graph, and the inference rules of DIL are restricted using conditions
on the graph and the nodes on formulas that are based on the interpretation of formulas
into the Kripke semantics. This idea in BINT logic comes from Pinto and Uustalu’s L [28],
but their work was inspired by Negri’s work on contraction and cut-free modal logics [25].
A system related to both L and DIL is Reed and Pfenning’s labeled intuitionistic logic
with a restricted notion of control operators. Their logic can also be seen as a restriction of
classical logic by labeling the formulas with strings of nodes representing a directed path in
the Kripke semantics. That is, a formula is of the form A[p] where p is a string of nodes where
if p = n1n2 · · ·ni−1ni then we can intuitively think of p as a path in the Kripke semantics,
and hence, p represents the path Rn1 (Rn2 (· · · (Rni−1 ni) · · · )), where R is the accessibility
relation. One very interesting aspect of their natural deduction formulation – which has a
term assignment – is that it contains the terms throw and catch, which are used to allow for
multiple conclusions. These give the logic some control like operators intuitionisticly. We
conjecture that the propositional fragment of Reed and Pfenning’s system should be able
to be embedded into DIL fairly straightforwardly. In fact, throw and catch correspond to
our axiom cuts mentioned in Section 4.2, which allows DIL to switch between the multiple
conclusions. Both L and DIL have a more general labeling than Reed and Pfenning’s system,
because theirs only speaks about a single path, and future worlds along that path, but L
and DIL allow one to talk about multiple different paths, and consider both future and past
worlds.
Similarly, to L, DIL, DTT, and Reed and Pfenning’s logic Murphy et al. use a labeling
system that annotates formulas with worlds, and use world constraints to restrict the logic
[24]. They even use the same syntax as DIL and DTT, that is, their formulas are denoted
by A@w, which stands for A is true at the world w. It would be interesting to see if their
work provides a means of extending DIL and DTT to BINT modal logic.
An alternative approach to Pinto and Uustalu’s L was given by Galmiche and Me´ry [11].
They give a labeled sequent calculus for BINT and a counter-model construction similar
to L, but they use a different method for constructing the labeled sequent calculus called
connection-based validity. Their system uses a different notion of graph called R-graphs
that annotate sequents, but these graphs are far more complex than the abstract Kripke
graphs of DIL and L. Me´ry et al. later implement an interactive theorem prover for their
system [23].
6 H. EADES, A. STUMP, AND R. MCCLEEARY
(formulas) A,B ,C ::= ⊤ | ⊥ |A ⊃ B |A ≺ B |A ∧ B |A ∨ B
(graphs) G ::= · | (n,n ′) |G,G′
(contexts) Γ,∆ ::= · |n : A |Γ,Γ′
(sequents) Q ::= Γ ⊢G ∆
Figure 1: Syntax of L.
3. Pinto and Uustalu’s L
In this section we briefly introduce Pinto and Uustalu’s L from [28]. The syntax for formulas,
graphs, and contexts of L are defined in Figure 1, while the inference rules are defined in
Figure 2. The formulas include true and false denoted ⊤ and ⊥ respectively, implication
and co-implication denoted A ⊃ B and A ≺ B respectively, and finally, conjunction and
disjunction denoted A ∧ B and A ∨ B respectively. So we can see that for every logical
connective its dual is a logical connective of the logic. This is what we meant by BINT
containing perfect intuitionistic duality in the introduction. Sequents have the form Γ ⊢G ∆,
where Γ and ∆ are multisets of formulas n : A labeled by a node n, G is the abstract Kripke
model or sometimes referred to as simply the graph of the sequent, and n is a node in G.
A graph is a multiset of directed edges where each edge is a pair of nodes. One should
view these edges as constraints on the accessibility relation in the Kripke semantics; see the
interpretation of graphs in Definition 4.7 and the definition validity for L in Definition 4.41.
We denote (n1,n2) ∈ G by n1Gn2. Furthermore, we denote the union of two graphs G and
G′ as G ∪ G′. Now each formula present in a sequent is labeled with a node in the graph.
This labeling is denoted n : A and should be read as the formula A is true at the node n.
We denote the operation of constructing the list of nodes in a graph or context by |G| and
|Γ| respectively. The reader should note that it is possible for some nodes in the sequent to
not appear in the graph. For example, the sequent n : A ⊢· n : A, · is a derivable sequent.
The complete graph can always be recovered if needed by using the graph structural rules
refl, trans, monL, and monR.
Consistency of L is stated in [28] without a detailed proof, but is proven complete with
respect to Rauszer’s Kripke semantics using a counter model construction. In Section 4
we give a translation of the formulas of L into the formulas of DIL (Section 4.2.1) and a
translation in the inverse direction (Section 4.2.2), which are both used to show completeness
of DIL in Section 4.2.
4. Dualized Intuitionistic Logic (DIL)
The syntax for polarities, formulas, and graphs of DIL are defined in Figure 3, where a
ranges over atomic formulas. The following definition shows that DIL’s formulas are simply
polarized versions of L’s formulas.
Definition 4.1. The following defines a translation of formulas of L to formulas of DIL:
D(⊤) = 〈+〉
D(⊥) = 〈−〉
D(A ∧ B) = D(A) ∧+ D(B)
D(A ∨ B) = D(A) ∧− D(B)
D(A ⊃ B) = D(A)→+ D(B)
D(B ≺ A) = D(A)→− D(B)
We represent graphs as lists of edges denoted n1 4p n2, where we denote an edge
from n1 to n2 by n1 4+ n2, and we denote the edge from n2 to n1 by n1 4− n2. Lastly,
contexts denoted Γ are represented as lists of formulas. Throughout the sequel we denote
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Γ ⊢G∪{(n,n)} ∆
Γ ⊢G ∆
refl
n1Gn2
n2Gn3
Γ ⊢G∪{(n1,n3)} ∆
Γ ⊢G ∆
trans
Γ,n : T ⊢G n : T ,∆
hyp
nGn ′
Γ,n : T ,n ′ : T ⊢G ∆
Γ,n : T ⊢G ∆
monL
n ′Gn
Γ ⊢G n
′ : T ,n : T ,∆
Γ ⊢G n : T ,∆
monR
Γ ⊢G ∆
Γ,n : ⊤ ⊢G ∆
trueL
Γ ⊢G n : ⊤,∆
trueR
Γ,n :⊥⊢G ∆
falseL
Γ ⊢G ∆
Γ ⊢G n :⊥,∆
falseR
Γ,n : T1,n : T2 ⊢G ∆
Γ,n : T1 ∧ T2 ⊢G ∆
andL
Γ ⊢G n : T1,∆
Γ ⊢G n : T2,∆
Γ ⊢G n : T1 ∧ T2,∆
andR
Γ,n : T1 ⊢G ∆
Γ,n : T2 ⊢G ∆
Γ,n : T1 ∨ T2 ⊢G ∆
disjL
Γ ⊢G n : T1,n : T2,∆
Γ ⊢G n : T1 ∨ T2,∆
disjR
nGn ′
Γ ⊢G n
′ : T1,∆
Γ,n ′ : T2 ⊢G ∆
Γ,n : T1 ⊃ T2 ⊢G ∆
impL
n ′ 6∈ |G|, |Γ|, |∆|
Γ,n ′ : T1 ⊢G∪{(n,n′)} n
′ : T2,∆
Γ ⊢G n : T1 ⊃ T2,∆
impR
n ′ 6∈ |G|, |Γ|, |∆|
Γ,n ′ : T1 ⊢G∪{(n,n′)} n
′ : T2,∆
Γ,n ′ : T1 ≺ T2 ⊢G ∆
subL
n ′Gn
Γ ⊢G n
′ : T1,∆
Γ,n ′ : T2 ⊢G ∆
Γ ⊢G n : T1 ≺ T2,∆
subR
Figure 2: Inference Rules for L.
(polarities) p ::= + | −
(formulas) A,B ,C ::= a | 〈p〉 |A →p B |A ∧p B
(graphs) G ::= · |n 4p n
′ |G,G′
(contexts) Γ ::= · | p A@ n |Γ,Γ′
(sequents) Q ::= G; Γ ⊢ p A@ n
Figure 3: Syntax for DIL.
the opposite of a polarity p by p¯. This is defined by +¯ = − and −¯ = +. The inference rules
for DIL are in Figure 4.
8 H. EADES, A. STUMP, AND R. MCCLEEARY
G ⊢ n 4∗p n
′
G; Γ, p A@ n,Γ′ ⊢ p A@ n ′
ax
G; Γ ⊢ p 〈p〉@ n
unit
G; Γ ⊢ p A@ n G; Γ ⊢ p B @ n
G; Γ ⊢ p (A ∧p B) @ n
and
G; Γ ⊢ p Ad @ n
G; Γ ⊢ p (A1 ∧p¯ A2) @ n
andBar
n ′ 6∈ |G|, |Γ|
(G,n 4p n
′); Γ, p A@ n ′ ⊢ p B @ n ′
G; Γ ⊢ p (A→p B) @ n
imp
G ⊢ n 4∗p¯ n
′
G; Γ ⊢ p¯ A@ n ′ G; Γ ⊢ p B @ n ′
G; Γ ⊢ p (A→p¯ B) @ n
impBar
G; Γ, p¯ A@ n ⊢ +B @ n ′ G; Γ, p¯ A@ n ⊢ −B @ n ′
G; Γ ⊢ p A@ n
cut
Figure 4: Inference Rules for DIL.
G,n 4p n ′, G′ ⊢ n 4∗p n
′
rel ax
G ⊢ n 4∗p n
rel refl
G ⊢ n 4∗p n
′ G ⊢ n ′ 4∗p n
′′
G ⊢ n 4∗p n
′′
rel trans
G ⊢ n ′ 4∗p¯ n
G ⊢ n 4∗p n
′
rel flip
Figure 5: Reachability Judgment for DIL.
The sequent has the form G; Γ ⊢ p A@n, which when p is positive (resp. negative) can
be read as the formula A is true (resp. false) at node n in the context Γ with respect to the
graph G. Note that the metavariable d in the premise of the AndBar rule ranges over the
set {1, 2} and prevents the need for two rules. The inference rules depend on a reachability
judgment that provides a means of proving when a node is reachable from another within
some graph G. This judgment is defined in Figure 5. In addition, the imp rule depends
on the operations |G| and |Γ| that simply compute the list of all the nodes in G and Γ
respectively. The condition n ′ 6∈ |G|, |Γ| in the imp rule is required for consistency.
The most interesting inference rules of DIL are the rules for implication and
co-implication from Figure 4. Let us consider these two rules in detail. These rules mimic
the definitions of the interpretation of implication and co-implication in a Kripke model.
The imp rule states that the formula p (A →p B) holds at node n if p A @ n
′ holds at an
arbitrary node n ′ where we add a new edge n 4p n
′ to the graph, then p B @ n ′ holds.
Notice that when p is positive n ′ will be a future node, but when p is negative n ′ will be
a past node. Thus, universally quantifying over past and future worlds is modeled here
by adding edges to the graph. Now the impBar rule states the formula p (A →p¯ B) is
derivable if there exists a node n ′ that is provably reachable from n, p¯ A is derivable at
node n ′, and p B @ n ′ is derivable at node n ′. When p is positive n ′ will be a past node,
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but when p is negative n ′ will be a future node. This is exactly dual to implication. Thus,
existence of past and future worlds is modeled by the reachability judgment.
Before moving on to proving consistency and completeness of DIL we first show that
the formula A ∧− ∼A has a proof in DIL that contains a cut that cannot be eliminated.
This also serves as an example of a derivation in DIL. Consider the following where we leave
off the reachability derivations for clarity and Γ′ ≡ − (A ∧− ∼A) @ n,−A@ n:
G; Γ,Γ
′
⊢ −A @ n
ax
G; Γ,Γ
′
⊢ + 〈+〉@ n
unit
G; Γ,Γ
′
⊢ + ∼A @ n
impBar
G; Γ,Γ′ ⊢ +(A ∧− ∼A) @ n
andBar
G; Γ,Γ′ ⊢ − (A ∧− ∼A) @ n
ax
G; Γ,− (A ∧− ∼A) @ n ⊢ +A @ n
cut
G; Γ,− (A ∧− ∼A) @ n ⊢ +(A ∧− ∼A) @ n
andBar
Now using only an axiom cut we may conclude the following derivation:
G; Γ,− (A ∧− ∼A) @ n ⊢ +(A ∧− ∼A) @ n G; Γ,− (A ∧− ∼A) @ n ⊢ − (A ∧− ∼A) @ n
ax
G; Γ ⊢ +(A ∧− ∼A) @ n
cut
The reader should take notice to the fact that all cuts within the previous two derivations are
axiom cuts – see the introduction to Section 4.2 for the definition of axiom cuts – where the
inner most cut uses the hypothesis of the outer cut. Therefore, neither can be eliminated.
4.1. Consistency of DIL. In this section we prove consistency of DIL with respect to
Rauszer’s Kripke semantics for BINT logic. All of the results in this section have been
formalized in the Agda proof assistant2. We begin by first defining a Kripke frame.
Definition 4.2. A Kripke frame is a pair (W,R) of a set of worlds W , and a preorder R
on W .
Then we extend the notion of a Kripke frame to include an evaluation for atomic
formulas resulting in a Kripke model.
Definition 4.3. AKripke model is a tuple (W,R, V ), such that, (W,R) is a Kripke frame,
and V is a binary monotone relation on W and the set of atomic formulas of DIL.
Now we can interpret formulas in a Kripke model as follows:
Definition 4.4. The interpretation of the formulas of DIL in a Kripke model (W,R, V ) is
defined by recursion on the structure of the formula as follows:
J〈+〉Kw = ⊤
J〈−〉Kw = ⊥
JaKw = V w a
JA ∧+ BKw = JAKw ∧ JBKw
JA ∧− BKw = JAKw ∨ JBKw
JA→+ BKw = ∀w
′ ∈W.Rw w ′ → JAKw ′ → JBKw ′
JA→− BKw = ∃w
′ ∈W.Rw ′ w ∧ ¬JAKw ′ ∧ JBKw ′
The interpretation of formulas really highlights the fact that implication is dual to
co-implication. Monotonicity holds for this interpretation.
Lemma 4.5 (Monotonicity). Suppose (W,R, V ) is a Kripke model, A is some DIL formula,
and w,w′ ∈W . Then Rw w ′ and JAKw imply JAKw ′.
2Agda source code is available at https://github.com/heades/DIL-consistency
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At this point we must set up the mathematical machinery that allows for the interpre-
tation of sequents in a Kripke model. This will require the interpretation of graphs, and
hence, nodes. We interpret nodes as worlds in the model using a function we call a node
interpreter.
Definition 4.6. Suppose (W,R, V ) is a Kripke model and S is a set of nodes of an abstract
Kripke model G. Then a node interpreter on S is a function from S to W .
Now using the node interpreter we can interpret edges as statements about the reacha-
bility relation in the model. Thus, the interpretation of a graph is just the conjunction of
the interpretation of its edges.
Definition 4.7. Suppose (W,R, V ) is a Kripke model, G is an abstract Kripke model, and
N is a node interpreter on the set of nodes of G. Then the interpretation of G in the Kripke
model is defined by recursion on the structure of the graph as follows:
J·KN = ⊤
Jn1 4+ n2, GKN = R (N n1) (N n2) ∧ JGKN
Jn1 4− n2, GKN = R (N n2) (N n1) ∧ JGKN
The reachability judgment of DIL provides a means to prove that two particular nodes
are reachable in the abstract Kripke graph, but this proof is really just a syntactic proof of
transitivity. The following lemma makes this precise.
Lemma 4.8 (Reachability Interpretation). Suppose (W,R, V ) is a Kripke model, and JGKN
for some abstract Kripke graph G. Then
i. if G ⊢ n1 4+ n2, then R (N n1) (N n2), and
ii. if G ⊢ n1 4− n2, then R (N n2) (N n1).
We have everything we need to interpret abstract Kripke models. The final ingredient
to the interpretation of sequents is the interpretation of contexts.
Definition 4.9. If F is some meta-logical formula, we define pF as follows:
+F = F and −F = ¬F.
Definition 4.10. Suppose (W,R, V ) is a Kripke model, Γ is a context, and N is a node
interpreter on the set of nodes in Γ. The interpretation of Γ in the Kripke model is defined
by recursion on the structure of the context as follows:
J·KN = ⊤
Jp A@ n,ΓKN = pJAK(N n) ∧ JΓKN
Combining these interpretations results in the following definition of validity.
Definition 4.11. Suppose (W,R, V ) is a Kripke model, Γ is a context, and N is a node
interpreter on the set of nodes in Γ. The interpretation of sequents is defined as follows:
JG; Γ ⊢ p A@ nKN = if JGKN and JΓKN , then pJAK(N n).
Then a sequent G; Γ ⊢ p A@ n is valid when JG; Γ ⊢ p A@ nKN holds for any N and in any
Kripke model.
Notice that in the definition of validity the graph G is interpreted as a set of constraints
imposed on the set of Kripke models, thus reinforcing the fact that the graphs on sequents
really are abstract Kripke models. Finally, using the previous definition of validity we can
prove consistency.
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Theorem 4.12 (Consistency). Suppose G; Γ ⊢ p A @ n. Then for any Kripke model
(W,R, V ) and node interpreter N on |G|, JG; Γ ⊢ p A@ nKN .
4.2. Completeness of DIL. DIL has a tight correspondence with Pinto and Uustalu’s L.
In [28] it is shown that L is complete with respect to Kripke models using a counter-model
construction; see Corollary 1 on p. 13 of ibid. We will exploit their completeness result
to show that DIL is complete. First, we will give a pair of translations: one from L to
DIL (Definition 4.29), and one from DIL to L (Definition 4.32). Using these translations
we will show that if a L-sequent3 is derivable, then its translation to DIL is also derivable
(Lemma 4.31), and vice versa (Lemma 4.37). Next we will relate validity of DIL with validity
of L, and show that if a DIL-sequent is valid with respect to the semantics of DIL, then its
translation to L is valid with respect to the semantics of L (Lemma 4.42). Finally, we can
use the previous result to show completeness of DIL (Theorem 4.43).
Throughout this section we assume without loss of generality that all L-sequents have
non-empty right-hand sides. That is, for every L-sequent, Γ ⊢G ∆, we assume that ∆ 6= ·.
We do not loose generality because it is possible to prove that Γ ⊢G · holds if and only if
Γ ⊢G n :⊥ for any node n (proof omitted).
We proved DIL consistent when DIL contained the general cut rule, but we prove DIL
complete when the cut rule has been replaced with the following two inference rules, which
can be seen as restricted instances of the cut rule:
p B @ n ′ ∈ (Γ, p¯ A@ n) G; Γ, p¯ A@ n ⊢ p¯ B @ n ′
G; Γ ⊢ p A@ n
axCut
p¯ B @ n ′ ∈ (Γ, p¯ A @ n) G; Γ, p¯ A@ n ⊢ p B @ n ′
G; Γ ⊢ p A@ n
axCutBar
4.2.1. A L to DIL Translation. In this section we show that every derivable L-sequent
can be translated into a derivable DIL-sequent. Before giving the translation we will first
show several admissibility results for DIL of inference rules that are similar to the ones we
mentioned in Section 4. These two rules are required for the crucial left-to-right lemma.
This lemma depends on the following admissible rule:
Lemma 4.13 (Weakening). If G; Γ ⊢ p2 B @n is derivable, then G; Γ, p1 A@n1 ⊢ p2 B @n1
is derivable.
Proof. This holds by straightforward induction on the assumed typing derivation.
Note that we will use admissible rules as if they are inference rules of the logic through-
out the sequel.
Lemma 4.14 (Left-to-Right). If G; Γ1, p¯ A@ n,Γ2 ⊢ p¯′ B @ n
′ is derivable, then
so is G; Γ1,Γ2, p
′ B @ n ′ ⊢ p A@ n.
Proof. Suppose G; Γ1, p¯ A@ n,Γ2 ⊢ p¯′B @ n
′ is derivable and Γ3 =
def Γ1, p¯ A@ n,Γ2. Then
we derive G; Γ1,Γ2, p
′ B @ n ′ ⊢ p A@ n as follows:
p′ B @ n ′ ∈ (Γ3, p
′ B @ n ′)
G; Γ3 ⊢ p¯′ B @ n
′
G; Γ3, p
′ B @ n ′ ⊢ p¯′ B @ n ′
Weakening
G; Γ1,Γ2, p
′ B @ n ′ ⊢ p A@ n
axCut
3We will call a sequent in L a L-sequent and a sequent in DIL a DIL-sequent.
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Thus, we obtain our result.
We mentioned in the introduction that DIL avoids having to have rules like the mono-
tonicity rules and other similar rules from L. To be able to translate every derivable sequent
of L to DIL, we must show admissibility of those rules in DIL. The first of these admissible
rules are the rules for reflexivity and transitivity.
Lemma 4.15 (Reflexivity). If G,m 4p′ m; Γ ⊢ p A @ n is derivable, then so is G; Γ ⊢
p A@ n.
Proof. This holds by a straightforward induction on the form of the assumed derivation.
Lemma 4.16 (Transitivity). If G,n1 4p′ n3; Γ ⊢ p A@ n is derivable, n1 4p′ n2 ∈ G and
n2 4p′ n3 ∈ G, then G; Γ ⊢ p A@ n is derivable.
Proof. This holds by a straightforward induction on the form of the assumed derivation.
There is not a trivial correspondence between conjunction in DIL and conjunction in L,
because of the use of polarities in DIL. Hence, we must show that L’s left rule for conjunction
is indeed admissible in DIL.
Lemma 4.17 (AndL). If G; Γ, p¯ A@ n ⊢ p B @ n is derivable, then G; Γ ⊢ p (A ∧p¯ B) @ n
is derivable.
Proof. This proof holds by directly deriving G; Γ ⊢ p (A∧p¯ B)@n in DIL. For the complete
proof see Appendix A.1.
L has several structural rules. The following lemmata show that all of these are admis-
sible in DIL.
Lemma 4.18 (Exchange). If G; Γ ⊢ p A@ n is derivable and pi is a permutation of Γ, then
G;pi Γ ⊢ p A@ n is derivable.
Proof. This holds by a straightforward induction on the form of the assumed derivation.
Note that we often leave the application of exchange implicit for readability.
Lemma 4.19 (Contraction). If G; Γ, p A@n, p A@n,Γ′ ⊢ p′ B@n ′, then G; Γ, p A@n,Γ′ ⊢
p′ B @ n ′.
Proof. This holds by a straightforward induction on the form of the assumed derivation.
Monotonicity is taken as a primitive in L, but we have decided to leave monotonicity as
an admissible rule in DIL. To show that it is admissible in DIL we need to be able to move
nodes forward in the abstract Kripke graph. This is necessary to be able to satisfy the graph
constraints in the rules imp and impBar when proving general monotonicity (Lemma 4.25).
The next result is just weakening for the reachability judgment.
Lemma 4.20 (Graph Weakening). If G ⊢ n1 4
∗
p n2, then G,n3 4p′ n4 ⊢ n1 4
∗
p n2.
Proof. This holds by a straightforward induction on the form of the assumed derivation.
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The function raise is an operation on abstract Kripke graphs that takes in two nodes n1
and n2, where n2 is reachable from n1, and then moves all the edges in an abstract Kripke
graph forward to n2. This essentially performs monotonicity on the given edges. It will
be used to show that nodes in the context of a DIL-sequent can be moved forward using
monotonicity resulting in a lemma called raising the lower bound logically (Lemma 4.24).
Definition 4.21. We define the function raise on abstract graphs as follows:
raise (n1,n2, ·) = ·
raise (n1,n2, (n1 4p m, G)) = n2 4p m, raise (n1,n2, G)
raise (n1,n2, (m 4p¯ n1, G)) = m 4p¯ n2, raise (n1,n2, G)
raise (n1,n2, (m 4p m
′, G)) = m 4p m
′, raise (n1,n2, G),where m 6≡ n1 and m
′ 6≡ n1.
raise (n1,n2, (m 4p¯ m
′, G)) = m 4p¯ m
′, raise (n1,n2, G),where m 6≡ n1 and m
′ 6≡ n1.
Lemma 4.22 (Raising the Lower Bound). If G ⊢ n1 4
∗
p n2 and G,G1 ⊢ m 4
∗
p′ m
′, then
G, raise (n1,n2, G1) ⊢ m 4
∗
p′ m
′.
Proof. This proof holds by induction on the form of G,G1 ⊢ m 4
∗
p′ m
′. For the full proof
see Appendix A.2.
Lemma 4.23 (Graph Node Containment). If G ⊢ n1 4
∗
p n2 and n1 and n2 are unique,
then n1,n2 ∈ |G|.
Proof. This holds by straightforward induction on the form of G ⊢ n1 4
∗
p n2.
Finally, we arrive to raising the lower bound logically and general monotonicity. The
latter depending on the former. These are the last of the admissibility results before showing
that all translations of derivable L-sequents are derivable in DIL.
Lemma 4.24 (Raising the Lower Bound Logically). If G,G1, G
′; Γ ⊢ p A@ n and G,G′ ⊢
n1 4
∗
p n2, then G, raise (n1,n2, G1), G
′; Γ ⊢ p A@ n.
Proof. This proof holds by induction on the form of G,G1, G
′; Γ ⊢ p A @ n. For the full
proof see Appendix A.3.
Lemma 4.25 (General Monotonicity). If G ⊢ n1 4
∗
p1
n ′1, . . . , G ⊢ ni 4
∗
pi
n ′i , G ⊢ m 4
∗
p
m ′, and G; p¯1 A1 @ n1, ... , p¯i Ai @ ni ⊢ p B @m, then G; p¯1A1@n
′
1, . . . , p¯iAi@n
′
i ⊢ p B @m
′.
Proof. This proof holds by induction on the form of G; p¯1 A1@ n1, ... , p¯i Ai @ ni ⊢ p B @m.
For the full proof see Appendix A.4.
The following are corollaries of general monotonicity. The latter two corollaries show
that the monotonicity rules of L are admissible in DIL.
Corollary 4.26 (Monotonicity). Suppose G ⊢ n1 4
∗
p n2. Then
i. if G; Γ, p¯ A@ n1,Γ
′ ⊢ p′ B @ n ′, then G; Γ, p¯ A@ n2,Γ
′ ⊢ p′B @ n ′, and
ii. if G; Γ ⊢ p A@ n1, then G; Γ ⊢ p A@ n2.
Corollary 4.27 (MonoL). If G; Γ, p A@ n1, p A@ n2,Γ
′ ⊢ p′B @ n ′ is derivable and n1 4p
n2 ∈ G, then G; Γ, p A@ n1,Γ
′ ⊢ p′ B @ n ′ is derivable.
Proof. This result easily follows by part one of Corollary 4.26, and contraction (Lemma 4.19).
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Corollary 4.28 (MonoR). If G; Γ, p¯ A @ n1,Γ
′ ⊢ p A @ n2 and n1 4p n2 ∈ G, then
G; Γ,Γ′ ⊢ p A@ n2 is derivable.
Proof. Suppose G; Γ, p¯ A @ n1,Γ
′ ⊢ p A @ n2 and n1 4p n2 ∈ G. Then by part one of
monotonicity (Corollary 4.26) we know G; Γ, p¯ A @ n2,Γ
′ ⊢ p A @ n2. Finally, we know by
the axiom cut rule that G; Γ,Γ′ ⊢ p A@ n2.
We now have everything we need to prove that every derivable sequent of L can be
translated to a derivable sequent in DIL. The following definition defines the translation
from L into DIL.
Definition 4.29. The following defines a translation of formulas of L to formulas of DIL:
D(⊤) = 〈+〉
D(⊥) = 〈−〉
D(A ∧ B) = D(A) ∧+ D(B)
D(A ∨ B) = D(A) ∧− D(B)
D(A ⊃ B) = D(A)→+ D(B)
D(B ≺ A) = D(A)→− D(B)
Next we extend the previous definition to contexts:
D(·)p = ·
D(n : A,Γ)p = p D(A) @ n,D(Γ)p
The following defines the translation of graphs:
D(·) = ·
D((n1,n2), G) = n1 4+ n2,D(G)
The translation of a L-sequent is a DIL-sequent that requires a particular formula as the
active formula. The following defines such a translation:
An activation of a L-sequent Γ ⊢G ∆ is a DIL-sequent
D(G);D(Γ)+,D(∆1,∆2)
− ⊢ +D(A) @ n, where ∆ = ∆1,n : A,∆2.
The previous definition implies the following result:
Lemma 4.30 (Reachability). If n1Gn2, then D(G) ⊢ n1 4
∗
+ n2.
The following result shows that every derivable L-sequent can be translated into a
derivable DIL-sequent. We do this by considering an arbitrary activation of the L-sequent,
and then show that this arbitrary activation is derivable in DIL, but if it so happens that
this is not the correct activation, then we can always get the correct one by using the
left-to-right lemma (Lemma 4.14) to switch out the active formula.
Lemma 4.31 (Containment of L in DIL). If D(G); Γ′ ⊢ +A @ n is an activation of the
derivable L-sequent Γ ⊢G ∆, then D(G); Γ
′ ⊢ +A@ n is derivable.
Proof. This proof holds by induction on the form of the sequent Γ ⊢G ∆. For the full proof
see Appendix A.5.
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4.2.2. A DIL to L Translation. This section is similar to the previous one, but we give a
translation of DIL-sequents to L-sequents. We first have the definition of the translation
from DIL to L.
Definition 4.32. The following defines a translation of formulas of DIL to formulas of L:
L(〈+〉) = ⊤
L(〈−〉) = ⊥
L(A ∧+ B) = L(A) ∧ L(B)
L(A ∧− B) = L(A) ∨ L(B)
L(A→+ B) = L(A) ⊃ L(B)
L(B →− A) = L(A) ≺ L(B)
Next we extend the previous definition to positive and negative contexts:
L(+A @ n,Γ)+ = n : L(A), L(Γ)+
L(−A @ n,Γ)+ = L(Γ)+
L(−A @ n,Γ)− = n : L(A), L(Γ)−
L(+A @ n,Γ)− = L(Γ)−
The following defines the translation of graphs:
L(n1 4+ n2, G) = (n1,n2), L(G)
L(n2 4− n1, G) = (n1,n2), L(G)
Finally, the following defines the translation of DIL sequents:
L(G; Γ ⊢ +A@ n) = L(Γ)+ ⊢L(G) n : A, L(Γ)
−
L(G; Γ ⊢ −A@ n) = L(Γ)+,n : A ⊢L(G) L(Γ)
−
Next we have a few admissible rules that are needed to complete the proof of containment
of DIL in L.
Lemma 4.33 (Left and Right Weakening in L).
weakL: If Γ,n : A ⊢G ∆, then Γ,n : A,n : B ⊢G ∆.
weakR: If Γ ⊢G n : A,∆, then Γ ⊢G n : A,n : B ,∆.
Proof. Both parts of this result hold by straightforward induction on the assumed derivation.
Lemma 4.34 (Left and Right Contraction in L).
contrL: If Γ1,n : A,Γ2,n : A,Γ3 ⊢G ∆, then Γ1,n : A,Γ2,Γ3 ⊢G ∆.
contrR: If Γ ⊢G ∆1,n : A,∆2,n : A,∆3, then Γ ⊢G ∆1,∆2,n : A,∆3.
Proof. Both parts of this result hold by straightforward induction on the assumed derivation.
Lemma 4.35 (Reachability Weakening in DIL). For any n1,n2 ∈ |n 4p n, G|, |Γ| if
G ⊢ n1 4
∗
p n2 and G; Γ ⊢ p A@ n, then G,n1 4p n2; Γ ⊢ p A@ n.
Proof. By straightforward induction on the form of G; Γ ⊢ p A@ n.
16 H. EADES, A. STUMP, AND R. MCCLEEARY
Finally, the next two results show that every derivable DIL-sequent can be translated
into a derivable L-sequent. One interesting aspect of these results is that DIL inference
rules where the active formula is positive correspond to the right-inference rules of L, and
when the active formula is negative correspond to left-inference rules of L. In addition, the
use of axiom cuts in DIL correspond to uses of contraction in L.
Lemma 4.36. Suppose G; Γ ⊢ p A@n is a derivable DIL-sequent such that for any n1,n2 ∈
|n 4p′ n, G|, |Γ| if G ⊢ n1 4
∗
p′ n2, then n1 4p′ n2 ∈ G. Then by using the definition of
the translation of DIL-sequents we have that L(G; Γ ⊢ p A@ n) is a derivable L-sequent.
Proof. This proof holds by induction on the assumed derivation. For the full proof see
Appendix A.6.
Lemma 4.37 (Containment of DIL in L). Suppose G; Γ ⊢ p A@n is a derivable DIL-sequent.
Then there exists an abstract Kripke graph G′, such that, L(G′; Γ ⊢ p A@ n).
Proof. Suppose G; Γ ⊢ p A @ n is a derivable DIL-sequent. Then by repeatedly applying
Reachability Weakening in DIL (Lemma 4.35), which can only be applied a finite number
of times before reaching a fixed point, we will obtain a derivation G′′; Γ ⊢ p A@n satisfying
the condition:
for any n1,n2 ∈ |n 4p′ n, G
′′|, |Γ|, if G′′ ⊢ n1 4
∗
p′ n2, then n1 4p′ n2 ∈ G
′′
Choose G′ = G′′. Then we obtain our result by applying Lemma 4.36 to G′; Γ ⊢ p A@ n.
4.2.3. Completeness. We now use the previous translations as a means to exploit the com-
pleteness result of L. The following definition and lemma relate the two translations that
will be needed by our main results of this section.
Definition 4.38. We say two abstract Kripke graphs, G1 and G2, are isomorphic iff for
any n1 4p n2 ∈ G1, n1 4p n2 ∈ G2 or n2 4p¯ n1 ∈ G2, and for any n1 4p n2 ∈ G2,
n1 4p n2 ∈ G1 or n2 4p¯ n1 ∈ G1.
Lemma 4.39 (L and D Relationships).
i. For any abstract Kripke graph G, D(L(G)) is isomorphic to G.
ii. For any abstract Kripke graph, L(D(G)) = G.
iii. For any DIL-formula A, D(L(A)) = A.
iv. For any L-formula A, L(D(A)) = A.
Proof. Part i and ii follow directly by induction on G, and part iii and iv follow directly by
induction on A.
It is straightforward to extend the previous result to contexts in both DIL and L.
The interpretation of L-formulas into a Kripke model is identical to the interpretation
of DIL-formulas. Thus, we use the same syntax to denote the interpretation of an L-formula.
In fact, we have the following straightforward result.
Lemma 4.40. Suppose (W,R, V ) is a Kripke model and N is a node interpreter. Then the
following hold:
i. JAK(N n) iff JL(A)KN n .
ii. JGKN iff for any n1L(G)n2, R (N n1) (N n2).
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iii. JΓKN iff for any n : L(A) ∈ L(Γ)
+, JL(A)KN n , and for any n : L(A) ∈ L(Γ)
−,
¬JL(A)KN n .
We recall the definition of validity in L due to Pinto and Uustalu [28].
Definition 4.41 (Counter Models and L-validity (p. 6, Definition 1, [28])). A Kripke model
(W,R, V ) and node interpreter N is a counter-model to a L-sequent Γ ⊢G ∆, if
i. for any n1Gn2, R (N n1) (N n2);
ii. for any n : A ∈ Γ, JAKN n ; and
iii. for any n : B ∈ ∆,¬JBKN n .
The L-sequent is L-valid if it has no counter-models.
The following lemma relates validity of DIL to validity of L, and is the key to proving
completeness of DIL.
Lemma 4.42 (DIL-validity is L-validity). Suppose JG; Γ ⊢ p A@nKN holds for some Kripke
model (W,R, V ) and node interpreter N on |G|. Then by using the translation of DIL-
sequents from Definition 4.2.2 we have that L(G; Γ ⊢ p A@ n) is L-valid.
Proof. This result holds essentially by definition. For the full proof see Appendix A.7.
Finally, we have completeness of DIL by connecting all of the results of this section.
Theorem 4.43 (Completeness). Suppose (W,R, V ) is a Kripke model and N is a node
interpreter. If JG; Γ ⊢ p A@ nKN holds, then G; Γ ⊢ p A@ n is derivable.
Proof. Suppose (W,R, V ) is a Kripke model and N is a node interpreter. Furthermore,
suppose JG; Γ ⊢ p A @ nKN holds. Let p = +. By Lemma 4.42 we know L(Γ)
+ ⊢L(G)
n : L(A), L(Γ)− is valid, and by completeness of L (Corollary 1, p. 13, [28]) we know
L(Γ)+ ⊢L(G) n : L(A), L(Γ)
− is derivable. By containment of L in DIL (Lemma 4.31) we
know that the activation D(L(G));D(L(Γ)+)+,D(L(Γ)−)− ⊢ +D(L(A)) @ n is derivable.
Finally, by Lemma 4.39 we can see that the former sequent is equivalent to G; Γ ⊢ p A@ n,
and thus, we obtain our result. The case when p = − is similar, but before using Lemma 4.39
one must first use the left-to-right admissible rule (Lemma 4.14).
5. Dualized Type Theory (DTT)
In this section we give DIL a term assignment yielding Dualized Type Theory (DTT). First,
we introduce DTT, and give several examples illustrating how to program in DTT. Then
we present the metatheory of DTT.
The syntax for DTT is defined in Figure 6. Polarities, types, and graphs are all the
same as they were in DIL. Contexts differ only by the addition of labeling each hypothesis
with a variable. Terms, denoted t , consist of introduction forms, together with cut terms
ν x .t · t ′4. We denote variables as x , y , z , . . . . The term triv is the introduction form for
units, (t , t ′) is the introduction form for pairs, similarly the terms in1 t and in2 t introduce
disjunctions, λx .t introduces implication, and 〈t , t ′〉 introduces co-implication. The type-
assignment rules are defined in Figure 7, and result from a simple term assignment to the
rules for DIL. Finally, the reduction rules for DTT are defined in Figure 8. The reduction
4In classical type theories the symbol µ usually denotes cut, but we have reserved that symbol – indexed
by a polarity – to be used with inductive (positive polarity) and coinductive (negative polarity) types in
future work.
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(indices) d ::= 1 | 2
(polarities) p ::= + | −
(types) A,B ,C ::= 〈p〉 |A→p B |A ∧p B
(terms) t ::= x | triv | (t , t ′) | ind t |λx .t | 〈t , t
′〉 | ν x .t ·t ′
(canonical terms) c ::= x | triv | (t , t ′) | ind t | λx .t | 〈t , t
′〉
(graphs) G ::= · |n 4p n
′ |G,G′
(contexts) Γ ::= · | x : p A@ n |Γ,Γ′
Figure 6: Syntax for DTT.
G ⊢ n 4∗p n
′
G; Γ, x : p A@ n,Γ′ ⊢ x : p A@ n ′
Ax
G; Γ ⊢ triv : p 〈p〉@ n
Unit
G; Γ ⊢ t1 : p A@ n G; Γ ⊢ t2 : p B @ n
G; Γ ⊢ (t1, t2) : p (A ∧p B) @ n
And
G; Γ ⊢ t : p Ad @ n
G; Γ ⊢ ind t : p (A1 ∧p¯ A2) @ n
AndBar
n ′ 6∈ |G|, |Γ|
(G,n 4p n
′); Γ, x : p A@ n ′ ⊢ t : p B @ n ′
G; Γ ⊢ λx .t : p (A→p B) @ n
Imp
G ⊢ n 4∗p¯ n
′
G; Γ ⊢ t1 : p¯ A@ n
′ G; Γ ⊢ t2 : p B @ n
′
G; Γ ⊢ 〈t1, t2〉 : p (A→p¯ B) @ n
ImpBar
G; Γ, x : p¯ A@ n ⊢ t1 : +B @ n
′
G; Γ, x : p¯ A@ n ⊢ t2 : −B @ n
′
G; Γ ⊢ ν x .t1·t2 : p A@ n Cut
Figure 7: Type-Assignment Rules for DTT.
rules should be considered rewrite rules that can be applied anywhere within a term. (The
congruence rules are omitted.)
Programming in DTT is not functional programming as usual, so we now give several
illustrative examples. The reader familiar with type theories based on sequent calculi will
find the following very familiar. The encodings are similar to that of Curien and Herbelin’s
λ¯µµ˜-calculus [9]. The locus of computation is the cut term, so naturally, function application
is modeled using cuts. Suppose
D1 =
def G; Γ ⊢ λx .t : + (A→+ B) @ n
D2 =
def G; Γ ⊢ t ′ : +A@ n
Γ′ =def Γ, y : −B @ n
Then we can construct the following typing derivation:
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ν z .λx .t ·〈t1, t2〉 ν z .[t1/x ]t ·t2 RImp
ν z .〈t1, t2〉·λx .t  ν z .t2· [t1/x ]t RImpBar ν z .(t1, t2)·in1 t  ν z .t1·t RAnd1
ν z .(t1, t2)·in2 t  ν z .t2·t RAnd2 ν z .in1 t ·(t1, t2) ν z .t ·t1 RAndBar1
ν z .in2 t ·(t1, t2) ν z .t ·t2 RAndBar2
x 6∈ FV (t)
ν x .t ·x  t RRet
ν z .(ν x .t1·t2)·t  ν z .[t/x ]t1· [t/x ]t2 RBetaL
ν z .c·(ν x .t1·t2) ν z .[c/x ]t1· [c/x ]t2 RBetaR
Figure 8: Reduction Rules for DTT.
D1
D2 G; Γ
′ ⊢ y : −B @ n
ax
G; Γ′ ⊢ 〈t ′, y〉 : − (A→+ B) @ n
impBar
G; Γ ⊢ ν y .λx .t ·〈t ′, y〉 : +B @ n
cut
Implication was indeed eliminated, yielding the conclusion.
There is some intuition one can use while thinking about this style of programming
that is based on the encoding of classical logic – Parigot’s λµ-calculus – into the pi-calculus.
See for example [35, 17]. We can think of positive variables as input ports, and negative
variables as output ports. Clearly, these notions are dual. Then a cut of the form ν z .t ·t ′
can be intuitively understood as a device capable of routing information. We think of this
term as first running the term t , and then plugging its value into the continuation t ′. Thus,
negative terms are continuations. Now consider the instance of the previous term ν z .t ·y
where t is a positive term and y is a negative variable (an output port). This can be
intuitively understood as after running t , route its value through the output port y . Now
consider the instance ν z .t · z . This term can be understood as after running the term t ,
route its value through the output port z , but then capture this value as the return value.
Thus, the cut term reroutes output ports into the actual return value of the cut.
There is one additional bit of intuition we can use when thinking about programming in
DTT. We can think of cuts of the form νz.(λx1 · · ·λxi.t)·〈t1, 〈t2, · · · 〈ti, z〉 · · · 〉 as an abstract
machine, where λx1 · · ·λxi.t is the functional part of the machine, and 〈t1, 〈t2, · · · 〈ti, z〉 · · · 〉
is the stack of inputs the abstract machine will apply the function to ultimately routing
the final result of the application through z , but rerouting this into the return value. This
intuition is not new, but was first observed by Curien and Herbelin in [9]; see also [10].
Similarly to the eliminator for implication we can define the eliminator for disjunction
in the form of the usual case analysis. Suppose G; Γ ⊢ t : + (A∧−B)@n, G; Γ, x : +A@n ⊢
t1 : +C @n, and G; Γ, x : +B@n ⊢ t2 : +C @n are all admissible. Then we can derive the
usual eliminator for disjunction. Define case t of x .t1, x .t2 =
def ν z0.(ν z1.(ν z2.t · (z1, z2))·
(ν x .t2·z0))·(ν x .t1·z0). Then we have the following result.
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Lemma 5.1. The following rule is derivable:
G; Γ, x : p A@ n ⊢ t1 : p C @ n
G; Γ, x : p B @ n ⊢ t2 : p C @ n G; Γ ⊢ t : p (A ∧p¯ B) @ n
G; Γ ⊢ case t of x .t1, x .t2 : p C @ n
case
Proof. A full derivation in DTT can be found in Appendix B.1.
Now consider the term ν x .in1 (ν y .in2 〈y , triv〉·x )·x . This term is the inhabitant of
the type A∧−∼A, and its typing derivation follows from the derivation given in Section 4.
We can see by looking at the syntax that the cuts involved are indeed on the axiom x , thus
this term has no canonical form. In [8] Crolard shows that inhabitants such as these amount
to a constructive coroutine. That is, it is a restricted form of a continuation.
We now consider several example reductions in DTT. In the following examples we
underline non-top-level redexes. The first example simply α-converts the function λx .x into
λz .z as follows:
λz .ν y .λx .x ·〈z , y〉 (RImp) λz .ν y .z ·y
(RRet)
 λz .z
A more involved example is the application of the function λx .(λy .y) to the arguments triv
and triv.
ν z .λx .(λy .y)·〈triv, 〈triv, z 〉〉 (RImp) ν z .λy .y ·〈triv, z 〉
(RImp)
 ν z .triv·z
(RRet)
 triv
6. Metatheory of DTT
We now present the basic metatheory of DTT, starting with type preservation. We begin
with the inversion lemma, which is necessary for proving type preservation.
Lemma 6.1 (Inversion).
i. If G; Γ ⊢ (t1, t2) : p (A ∧p B) @ n, then G; Γ ⊢ t1 : p A@ n and G; Γ ⊢ t2 : p B @ n.
ii. If G; Γ ⊢ ind t : p (A1 ∧p¯ A2) @ n, then G; Γ ⊢ t : p Ad @ n.
iii. If G; Γ ⊢ λx .t : p (A→p B) @ n, then (G,n 4p n
′); Γ, x : p A@ n ′ ⊢ t : p B @ n ′ for any
n ′ 6∈ |G|, |Γ|.
iv. If G; Γ ⊢ 〈t1, t2〉 : p (A →p¯ B) @ n, then G ⊢ n 4
∗
p¯ n
′, G; Γ ⊢ t1 : p¯ A @ n
′, and
G; Γ ⊢ t2 : p B @ n
′ for some node n ′.
Proof. Each case of the above lemma holds by a trivial proof by induction on the assumed
typing derivation.
The results node substitution and substitution for typing are essential for the cases of type
preservation that reduce a top-level redex. Node substitution, denoted [n1/n2]n, is defined
as follows:
[n1/n2]n2 = n1
[n1/n2]n = n where n is distinct from n2
The following lemmas are necessary in the proof of node substitution for typing.
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Γ, x : p A,Γ′ ⊢c x : p A
ClassAx
Γ ⊢c triv : p 〈p〉
ClassUnit
Γ ⊢c t1 : p A Γ ⊢c t2 : p B
Γ ⊢c (t1, t2) : p (A ∧p B)
ClassAnd
Γ ⊢c t : p Ad
Γ ⊢c ind t : p (A1 ∧p¯ A2)
ClassAndBar
Γ, x : p A ⊢c t : p B
Γ ⊢c λx .t : p (A→p B)
ClassImp
Γ ⊢c t1 : p¯ A Γ ⊢c t2 : p B
Γ ⊢c 〈t1, t2〉 : p (A→p¯ B)
ClassImpBar
Γ, x : p¯ A ⊢c t1 : +B
Γ, x : p¯ A ⊢c t2 : −B
Γ ⊢c ν x .t1·t2 : p A ClassCut
Figure 9: Classical typing of DTT terms
Lemma 6.2 (Node Renaming). If G1, G2 ⊢ n1 4
∗
p n3, then for any nodes n4 and n5, we
have [n4/n5]G1, [n4/n5]G2 ⊢ [n4/n5]n1 4
∗
p [n4/n5]n3.
Proof. This proof holds by induction on the assumed reachability derivation. For the full
proof see Appendix C.1.
Lemma 6.3 (Node Substitution for Reachability). If G,n1 4p1 n2, G
′ ⊢ n4 4
∗
p n5 and
G,G′ ⊢ n1 4
∗
p1
n3, then [n3/n2]G, [n3/n2]G
′ ⊢ [n3/n2]n4 4
∗
p [n3/n2]n5.
Proof. This proof holds by by induction on the form of the assumed reachability derivation.
For the full proof see Appendix C.2.
Lemma 6.4 (Node Substitution for Typing). If G,n1 4p1 n2, G
′; Γ ⊢ t : p2A @ n3 and
G,G′ ⊢ n1 4
∗
p1
n4, then [n4/n2]G, [n4/n2]G
′; [n4/n2]Γ ⊢ t : p2A@ [n4/n2]n3.
Proof. This holds by induction on the form of the assumed typing derivation. See Appen-
dix C.3 for the full proof.
The next lemma is crucial for type preservation.
Lemma 6.5 (Substitution for Typing). If G; Γ ⊢ t1 : p1A@ n1 and G; Γ, x : p1A@ n1,Γ
′ ⊢
t2 : p2 B @ n2, then G; Γ,Γ
′ ⊢ [t1/x ]t2 : p2 B @ n2.
Proof. This proof holds by induction on the second assumed typing relation. For the full
proof see Appendix C.4.
Lemma 6.6 (Type Preservation). If G; Γ ⊢ t : p A@n, and t  t ′, then G; Γ ⊢ t ′ : p A@n.
Proof. This proof holds by induction on the form of the assumed typing derivation. For the
full proof see Appendix C.5.
A more substantial property is strong normalization of reduction for typed terms. To
prove this result, we will prove a stronger property, namely strong normalization for reduc-
tion of terms that are typable using the system of classical typing rules in Figure 9 [7]. This
is justified by the following easy result (proof omitted), where DN(Γ) just drops the world
annotations from assumptions in Γ:
Theorem 6.7. If G; Γ ⊢ t : p A@ n, then DN(Γ) ⊢c t : p A
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t ∈ JAK+ ⇔ ∀x ∈ Var. ∀t′ ∈ JAK−. ν x .t ·t ′ ∈ SN
t ∈ JAK− ⇔ ∀x ∈ Var. ∀t′ ∈ JAK+c. ν x .t ′·t ∈ SN
t ∈ J〈+〉K+c ⇔ t ∈ Var ∨ t ≡ triv
t ∈ J〈−〉K+c ⇔ t ∈ Var
t ∈ JA→+ BK
+c ⇔ t ∈ Var ∨ ∃x, t′.t ≡ λx. t′ ∧ ∀t′′ ∈ JAK+. [t′′/x]t′ ∈ JBK+
t ∈ JA→− BK
+c ⇔ t ∈ Var ∨ ∃t1 ∈ JAK
−, t2 ∈ JBK
+. t ≡ 〈t1, t2〉
t ∈ JA ∧+ BK
+c ⇔ t ∈ Var ∨ ∃t1 ∈ JAK
+, t2 ∈ JBK
+. t ≡ (t1, t2)
t ∈ JA1 ∧− A2K
+c ⇔ t ∈ Var ∨ ∃d.∃t′ ∈ JAdK
+. t ≡ ind t
′
Figure 10: Interpretations of types
Let SN be the set of terms that are strongly normalizing with respect to the reduction
relation. Let Var be the set of term variables, and let us use x and y as metavariables for
variables. We will prove strong normalization for classically typed terms using a version of
Krivine’s classical realizability [20]. We define three interpretations of types in Figure 10.
The definition is by mutual induction, and can easily be seen to be well-founded, as the
definition of JAK+ invokes the definition of JAK− with the same type, which in turn invokes
the definition of JAK+c with the same type; and the definition of JAK+c may invoke either
of the other definitions at a strictly smaller type. The reader familiar with such proofs will
also recognize the debt owed to Girard [12].
Lemma 6.8 (Step interpretations). If t ∈ JAK+ and t  t′, then t′ ∈ JAK+; and similarly
if t ∈ JAK− or t ∈ JAK+c.
Proof. The proof is by a mutual well-founded induction. Assume t ∈ JAK+ and t t′. We
must show t′ ∈ JAK+. For this, it suffices to assume y ∈ Var and t′′ ∈ JAK−, and show
ν y .t ′·t ′′ ∈ SN. From the assumption that t ∈ JAK+, we have
ν y .t ·t ′′ ∈ SN
which indeed implies that
ν y .t ′·t ′′ ∈ SN
A similar argument applies if t ∈ JAK−.
For the last part of the lemma, assume t ∈ JAK+c with t  t′, and show t′ ∈ JAK+c.
The only possible cases are the following, where t 6∈ Vars.
If A ≡ A1 →+ A2, then t is of the form λx.ta for some x and ta, where for all tb ∈ JA1K
+,
we have [tb/x]ta ∈ JA2K
+. Since t t′, t′ must be λx.t′a for some t
′
a with ta  t
′
a. It suffices
now to assume an arbitrary tb ∈ JA1K
+, and show [tb/x]t
′
a ∈ JA2K
+. But [tb/x]ta  [tb/x]t
′
a
follows from ta  t
′
a, so by our IH, we have [tb/x]t
′
a ∈ JA2K
+, as required.
If A ≡ A1 →− A2, then t is of the form 〈t1, t2〉 for some t1 ∈ JA1K
− and t2 ∈ JA2K
+;
and t′ ≡ 〈t ′1, t
′
2〉 where either t
′
1 ≡ t1 and t2  t
′
2 or else t1  t
′
1 and t
′
2 ≡ t2. Either way, we
have t′1 ∈ JA1K
− and t′2 ∈ JA2K
+ by our IH, so we have 〈t ′1, t
′
2〉 ∈ JA1 →− A2K
+c as required.
The other cases for A ≡ A1 ∧p A2 are similar to the previous one.
Lemma 6.9 (SN interpretations).
1. JAK+ ⊆ SN 3. JAK− ⊆ SN
2. Vars ⊆ JAK− 4. JAK+c ⊆ SN
Proof. The proof holds by mutual well-founded induction on the pair (A,n), where n is
the number of the proposition in the statement of the lemma; the well-founded ordering in
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question is the lexicographic combination of the structural ordering on types (for A) and
the ordering 1 > 2 > 4 > 3 (for n). For the full proof see Appendix C.6.
Definition 6.10 (Interpretation of contexts). JΓK is the set of substitutions σ such that for
all x : p A ∈ Γ, σ(x) ∈ JAKp.
Lemma 6.11 (Canonical positive is positive). JAK+c ⊆ JAK+
Proof. Assume t ∈ JAK+c and show t ∈ JAK+. For the latter, assume arbitrary x ∈ Vars
and t′ ∈ JAK−, and show ν x .t · t ′ ∈ SN. This follows immediately from the assumption
that t′ ∈ JAK−.
Theorem 6.12 (Soundness). If Γ ⊢c t : p A then for all σ ∈ JΓK, σt ∈ JAK
p.
Proof. The proof holds by induction on the derivation of Γ ⊢c t : p A. For the full proof see
Appendix C.7.
Corollary 6.13 (Strong Normalization). If G; Γ ⊢ t : p A@ n, then t ∈ SN.
Proof. This follows easily by putting together Theorems 6.7 and 6.12, with Lemma 6.9.
Corollary 6.14 (Cut Elimination). If G; Γ ⊢ t : p A @ n, then there is normal t′ with
t ∗ t′ and t′ containing only cut terms of the form ν x .y ·t or ν x .t ·y, for y a variable.
Lemma 6.15 (Local Confluence). The reduction relation of Figure 8 is locally confluent.
Proof. We may view the reduction rules as higher-order pattern rewrite rules. It is easy
to confirm that all critical pairs (e.g., between RBetaR and the rules RImp, RImpBar,
RAnd1, RAndBar1, RAnd2, and RAndBar2) are joinable. Local confluence then fol-
lows by the higher-order critical pair lemma [26].
Theorem 6.16 (Confluence for Typable Terms). The reduction relation restricted to terms
typable in DTT is confluent.
Proof. Suppose G; Γ ⊢ t : p A@ n for some G, Γ, p, and A. By Lemma 6.6, any reductions
in the unrestricted reduction relation from t are also in the reduction relation restricted
to typable terms. The result now follows from Newman’s Lemma, using Lemma 6.15 and
Theorem 6.13.
7. Conclusion
We have presented a new type theory for bi-intuitionistic logic. We began with a compact
dualized formulation of the logic, Dualized Intuitionistic Logic (DIL), and showed soundness
with respect to a standard Kripke semantics (in Agda), and completeness with respect
to Pinto and Uustalu’s system L. We then presented Dualized Type Theory (DTT), and
showed type preservation, strong normalization, and confluence for typable terms. Future
work includes further additions to DTT, for example with polymorphism and inductive
types. It would also be interesting to obtain a Canonicity Theorem as in [34], identifying
some set of types where closed normal forms are guaranteed to be canonical values (as
canonicity fails in general in DIL/DTT, as in other bi-intuitionistic systems).
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Appendix A. Proofs from Section 4.2: Completeness of DIL
A.1. Proof of Lemma 4.17. Suppose G; Γ, p¯ A@ n ⊢ p B @ n is derivable. By weakening
we know G; Γ, p¯ (A ∧p¯ B) @ n, p¯ B @ n, p¯ A @ n ⊢ p B @ n. Then G; Γ ⊢ p (A ∧p¯ B) @ n is
derivable as follows:
p¯ (A ∧p¯ B) @ n ∈ Γ, p¯ (A ∧p¯ B) @ n
D1 D2
G; Γ, p¯ (A ∧p¯ B) @ n ⊢ p B @ n
Cut
G; Γ, p¯ (A ∧p¯ B) @ n ⊢ p (A ∧p¯ B) @ n
AndBar
G; Γ ⊢ p (A ∧p¯ B) @ n
axCut
where we have the following subderivations:
D0 :
G; Γ, p¯ (A ∧p¯ B) @ n, p¯ B @ n, p A@ n ⊢ p A @ n
ax
G; Γ, p¯ (A ∧p¯ B) @ n, p¯ B @ n, p A@ n ⊢ p (A ∧p¯ B) @ n
AndBar
D1 :
p¯ B @ n ∈ Γ, p¯ (A ∧p¯ B) @ n, p¯ B @ n, p¯ A@ n G; Γ, p¯ (A ∧p¯ B) @ n, p¯ B @ n, p¯ A@ n ⊢ p B @ n
G; Γ, p¯ (A ∧p¯ B) @ n, p¯ B @ n ⊢ p A@ n
axCut
D2 :
p¯ (A ∧p¯ B) @ n ∈ Γ, p¯ (A ∧p¯ B) @ n, p¯ B @ n, p A @ n D0
G; Γ, p¯ (A ∧p¯ B) @ n, p¯ B @ n ⊢ p¯ A@ n
axCut
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A.2. Proof of Lemma 4.22: Raising the Lower Bound. This is a proof by induction
on the form of G,G1 ⊢ m 4
∗
p′ m
′.
:
Case
G′,m 4p′ m
′, G′′ ⊢ m 4∗p′ m
′ ax
Note that it is the case that G′,m 4p′ m
′, G′′ ≡ G,G1. If m 4p′ m
′ ∈ G, then we
obtain our result, so suppose m 4p′ m
′ ∈ G1. Suppose p ≡ p
′. Now if m 6≡ n1, then
clearly, we obtain our result. Consider the case where m ≡ n1. Then it suffices to show
G, raise (n1,n2, G
′
1),n2 4p m
′, raise (n1,n2, G
′′
1) ⊢ n1 4
∗
p m
′ where G1 ≡ G
′
1,n1 4p
m ′, G′′1 . This holds by the following derivation:
G ⊢ n1 4
∗
p n2 G, raise (n1,n2, G
′
1
),n2 4p m
′
, raise (n1,n2, G
′′
1
) ⊢ n2 4
∗
p m
′
rel ax
G, raise (n1,n2, G
′
1
),n2 4p m
′
, raise (n1,n2, G
′′
1
) ⊢ n1 4
∗
p m
′
rel trans
Now suppose p′ ≡ p¯. if m ′ 6≡ n1, then clearly, we obtain our result. Consider the case
wherem ′ ≡ n1. Then it suffices to show G, raise (n1,n2, G
′
1),m 4p¯ n2, raise (n1,n2, G
′′
1) ⊢
m 4∗p¯ n1 where G1 ≡ G
′
1,m 4p¯ n1, G
′′
1 . This holds by the following derivation:
G, raise (n1,n2, G
′
1
),m 4p¯ n2, raise (n1,n2, G
′′
1
) ⊢ m 4∗p¯ n2
rel ax
G ⊢ n1 4
∗
p n2
G ⊢ n2 4
∗
p¯ n1
rel flip
G, raise (n1,n2, G
′
1
),m 4p¯ n2, raise (n1,n2, G
′′
1
) ⊢ m 4∗p¯ n1
rel trans
:
Case
G,G1 ⊢ m 4
∗
p′ m
refl
Note that in this case m ′ ≡ m. Our result follows from simply an application of the
rel refl rule.
:
Case
G,G1 ⊢ m 4
∗
p′ m
′′ G,G1 ⊢ m
′′
4
∗
p′ m
′
G,G1 ⊢ m 4
∗
p′ m
′ rel trans
This case holds by two applications of the induction hypothesis followed by applying the
rel trans rule.
:
Case
G,G1 ⊢ m
′
4
∗
p¯′
m
G,G1 ⊢ m 4
∗
p′ m
′ flip
This case holds by an application of the induction hypothesis followed by applying the
rel flip rule.
A.3. Proof of Lemma 4.24: Raising the Lower Bound Logically. This is a proof by
induction on the form of G,G1, G
′; Γ ⊢ p A@ n. We assume with out loss of generality that
n1 ∈ |G1|, and that n1 6≡ n2. If this is not the case then raise (n1,n2, G1) = G1, and the
result holds trivially.
:
Case
G,G1, G
′ ⊢ n ′ 4∗p n
G,G1, G
′; Γ, p A@ n ′ ⊢ p A@ n
ax
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Clearly, if G,G1, G
′ ⊢ n ′ 4∗p n, then G,G
′, G1 ⊢ n
′ 4∗p n. Thus, this case follows by
raising the lower bound (Lemma 4.22), and applying the ax rule.
:
Case
G,G1, G
′; Γ ⊢ p 〈p〉@ n
unit
Trivial.
:
Case
G,G1, G
′; Γ ⊢ p A1 @ n G,G1, G
′; Γ ⊢ p A2 @ n
G,G1, G
′; Γ ⊢ p (A1 ∧p A2) @ n
and
This case holds by two applications of the induction hypothesis, and then applying the
and rule.
:
Case
G,G1, G
′; Γ ⊢ p Ad @ n
G,G1, G
′; Γ ⊢ p (A1 ∧p¯ A2) @ n
andBar
Similar to the previous case.
:
Case
n ′ 6∈ |G,G1, G
′|, |Γ|
(G,G1, G
′,n 4p n
′); Γ, p A1 @ n
′ ⊢ p A2 @ n
′
G,G1, G
′; Γ ⊢ p (A1 →p A2) @ n
imp
Since we know n1 6≡ n2, then by Lemma 4.23 we know n1,n2 ∈ |G,G
′|. Thus, n ′ 6≡
n1 6≡ n2. Now by the induction hypothesis we know (G, raise (n1,n2, G1), G
′,n 4p
n ′); Γ, p A1 @ n
′ ⊢ p A2 @ n
′. This case then follows by the application of the imp rule
to the former.
:
Case
G,G1, G
′ ⊢ n 4∗p¯ n
′
G,G1, G
′; Γ ⊢ p¯ A1 @ n
′ G,G1, G
′; Γ ⊢ p A2 @ n
′
G,G1, G
′; Γ ⊢ p (A1 →p¯ A2) @ n
impBar
Clearly, G,G1, G
′ ⊢ n 4∗p¯ n
′ implies G,G′, G1 ⊢ n 4
∗
p¯ n
′, and by raising the lower
bound (Lemma 4.22) we know G,G′, raise (n1,n2, G1) ⊢ n 4
∗
p¯ n
′, which then implies
G, raise (n1,n2, G1), G
′ ⊢ n 4∗p¯ n
′. Thus, this case follows from applying impBar to the
application of the induction hypothesis to each premise and
G, raise (n1,n2, G1), G
′ ⊢ n 4∗p¯ n
′.
:
Case
p T ′ @ n ′ ∈ Γ G,G1, G
′; Γ, p¯ T @ n ⊢ p¯ T ′ @ n ′
G,G1, G
′; Γ ⊢ p T @ n
axCut
This case follows by a simple application of the induction hypothesis, and then reapplying
the rule.
:
Case
p¯ T ′ @ n ′ ∈ Γ G,G1, G
′; Γ, p¯ T @ n ⊢ p T ′ @ n ′
G,G1, G
′; Γ ⊢ p T @ n
axCutBar
Similar to the previous case.
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A.4. Proof of Lemma 4.25: General Monotonicity. This is a proof by induction on
the form of G; p¯1A1 @ n1, ... , p¯i Ai @ ni ⊢ p B @ m. We assume without loss of generality
that all of n1,n
′
1 . . . ,ni ,n
′
i are unique. Thus, they are all members of |G| by Lemma 4.23.
:
Case
G ⊢ nj 4
∗
p¯j
m
G; p¯1 A1 @ n1, ... , p¯i Ai @ ni ⊢ p¯j Aj @m
ax
It must be the case that p B @ m ≡ p¯j Aj @ m for some 1 ≤ j ≤ i. In addition,
we know G ⊢ nj 4
∗
pj
n ′j , G ⊢ nj 4
∗
p¯j
m, and G ⊢ m 4∗p¯j m
′. It suffices to show
G; p¯1A1@n
′
1, . . . , p¯iAi@n
′
i ⊢ p¯j Aj @m
′, but to obtain this result it suffices to show that
G ⊢ n ′j 4p¯j m
′, but this holds by first using rel flip to obtain G ⊢ n ′j 4
∗
p¯j
nj followed
by two applications of transitivity.
:
Case
G; p¯1 A1 @ n1, ... , p¯i Ai @ ni ⊢ p 〈p〉@m1
unit
Trivial.
:
Case
G; p¯1 A1 @ n1, ... , p¯i Ai @ ni ⊢ p B1 @m
G; p¯1 A1 @ n1, ... , p¯i Ai @ ni ⊢ p B2 @m
G; p¯1 A1 @ n1, ... , p¯i Ai @ ni ⊢ p (B1 ∧p B2) @m
and
This case follows easily by applying the induction hypothesis to each premise and then
applying the and rule.
:
Case
G; p¯1 A1 @ n1, ... , p¯i Ai @ ni ⊢ p Bd @m
G; p¯1 A1 @ n1, ... , p¯i Ai @ ni ⊢ p (B1 ∧p¯ B2) @m
andBar
This case follows easily by the induction hypothesis and then applying andBar.
:
Case
n ′ 6∈ |G|, |p¯1A1 @ n1, ... , p¯i Ai @ ni |
(G,m1 4p n
′); p¯1 A1 @ n1, ... , p¯i Ai @ ni , p B1 @ n
′ ⊢ p B2 @ n
′
G; p¯1 A1 @ n1, ... , p¯i Ai @ ni ⊢ p (B1 →p B2) @m
imp
We know by assumption G ⊢ n1 4
∗
p1
n ′1, . . . , G ⊢ ni 4
∗
pi
n ′i , and by graph weakening
(Lemma 4.20) G,m 4p n
′ ⊢ n1 4
∗
p1
n ′1, . . . , G,m 4p n
′ ⊢ ni 4
∗
pi
n ′i . We also know by
applying the rel refl rule that G,m 4p n
′ ⊢ n ′ 4∗p¯ n
′ and G,m 4p n
′ ⊢ n ′ 4∗p n
′.
Thus, by the induction hypothesis we know (G,m 4p n
′); p¯1A1@n
′
1, . . . , p¯iAi@n
′
i , p B1@
n ′ ⊢ p B2 @ n
′. Now we can raise the lower bound logically (Lemma 4.24) with G1 ≡
m 4p n
′ and the assumption G ⊢ m 4∗p m
′ to obtain
(G, raise (m,m ′,m 4p n
′)); p¯1A1@n
′
1, . . . , p¯iAi@n
′
i , p B1 @ n
′ ⊢ p B2 @ n
′, but this is
equivalent to (G,m 4p n
′); p¯1A1@n
′
1, . . . , p¯iAi@n
′
i , p B1@ n
′ ⊢ p B2@ n
′. Finally, using
the former, we obtain our result by applying the imp rule.
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:
Case
G ⊢ m 4∗p¯ n
′
G; p¯1 A1 @ n1, ... , p¯i Ai @ ni ⊢ p¯ B1 @ n
′
G; p¯1 A1 @ n1, ... , p¯i Ai @ ni ⊢ p B2 @ n
′
G; p¯1 A1 @ n1, ... , p¯i Ai @ ni ⊢ p (B1 →p¯ B2) @m
impBar
We can easily derive G ⊢ m ′ 4∗p¯ n
′ as follows:
Case
G ⊢ m 4∗p¯ n
′
G ⊢ n ′ 4∗p m
rel flip
G ⊢ m 4∗p m
′
G ⊢ n ′ 4∗p m
′ rel trans
G ⊢ m ′ 4∗p¯ n
′ rel flip
This case then follows by applying the induction hypothesis twice to both G; p¯1 A1 @
n1, ... , p¯i Ai @ ni ⊢ p¯ B1 @ n
′ and G; p¯1 A1 @ n1, ... , p¯i Ai @ ni ⊢ p B2 @ n
′ using the
assumptions G ⊢ n1 4
∗
p1
n ′1, . . . , G ⊢ ni 4
∗
pi
n ′i , and the fact that we know G ⊢ n
′ 4∗p
n ′ and G ⊢ n ′ 4∗p¯ n
′.
:
Case
p¯j Aj @ nj ∈ (p¯1A1 @ n1, ... , p¯i Ai @ ni)
G; p¯1 A1 @ n1, ... , p¯i Ai @ ni , p¯ B @m ⊢ pj Aj @ nj
G; p¯1 A1 @ n1, ... , p¯i Ai @ ni ⊢ p B @m
axCut
We know by assumption that G ⊢ n1 4
∗
p1
n ′1, . . . , G ⊢ ni 4
∗
pi
n ′i , and G ⊢ m 4
∗
p m
′.
In particular, we know G ⊢ nj 4
∗
pj
n ′j . It is also the case that if p¯j Aj @ nj ∈ (p¯1A1 @
n1, ... , p¯i Ai @ ni ), then p¯j Aj @ n
′
j ∈ (p¯1A1@n
′, . . . , p¯iAi@n
′
i). This case then follows by
applying the induction hypothesis to G; p¯1 A1 @ n1, ... , p¯i Ai @ ni , p¯ B @m ⊢ pj Aj @ nj ,
to obtain, G; p¯1A1@n
′
1, . . . , p¯iAi@n
′
i , p¯ B @ m
′
1 ⊢ pj Aj @ n
′
j , followed by applying the
axCut rule.
:
Case
p¯j Aj @ nj ∈ (p¯1 A1 @ n1, ... , p¯i Ai @ ni )
G; p¯1 A1 @ n1, ... , p¯i Ai @ ni , p¯ B @m ⊢ pj Aj @ nj
G; p¯1 A1 @ n1, ... , p¯i Ai @ ni ⊢ p B @m
axCutBar
Similar to the previous case.
A.5. Proof of Lemma 4.31: Containment of L in DIL. This is a proof by induction
on the form of the sequent Γ ⊢G ∆.
:
Case
Γ ⊢G,(n,n) ∆
Γ ⊢G ∆
refl
We know by the induction hypothesis that every activation of Γ ⊢G,(n,n) ∆ is derivable.
Suppose that D(G, (n,n));D(Γ)+ ,Γ′ ⊢ +A@n is an arbitrary activation, whereD(∆)− ≡
D(∆1)
−,−A@ n,D(∆2)
− and Γ′ ≡ D(∆1)
−,D(∆2)
−. This is equivalent to D(G),n 4+
n;D(Γ)+,Γ′ ⊢ +A@ n, and by the admissible rule for reflexivity (Lemma 4.15) we have
D(G);D(Γ)+,Γ′ ⊢ +A@ n.
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:
Case
n1Gn2
n2Gn3
Γ ⊢G,(n1,n3) ∆
Γ ⊢G ∆
Trans
We know by the induction hypothesis that every activation of Γ ⊢G,(n1,n3) ∆ is deriv-
able. Suppose that D(G, (n1,n3));D(Γ)
+,Γ′ ⊢ +A@ n is an arbitrary activation, where
D(∆)− ≡ D(∆1)
−,−A @ n,D(∆2)
− and Γ′ ≡ D(∆1)
−,D(∆2)
−. This sequent is equiv-
alent to D(G),n1 4+ n3;D(Γ)
+,Γ′ ⊢ +A @ n. Furthermore, it is clear by definition
that if n1Gn2 and n2Gn3, then n1 4+ n2 ∈ D(G) and n2 4+ n3 ∈ D(G). Thus, by the
admissible rule for transitivity (Lemma 4.16) we have D(G);D(Γ)+,Γ′ ⊢ +A @ n, and
we obtain our result.
:
Case
Γ,n : A ⊢G n : A,∆
hyp
It suffices to show that every activation of Γ,n : A ⊢G n : A,∆ is derivable. Clearly,
D(G);D(Γ)+,+D(A) @ n,D(∆)− ⊢ +D(A) @ n is a activation of Γ,n : A ⊢G n : A,∆.
In addition, it is derivable:
D(G) ⊢ n 4∗+ n
Refl
D(G);D(Γ)+,D(∆)−,+D(A) @ n ⊢ +D(A) @ n
Ax
D(G);D(Γ)+,+D(A) @ n,D(∆)− ⊢ +D(A) @ n
Exchange
In the previous derivation we make use of the exchange rule, which is admissible by
Lemma 4.18.
Now consider any other activation D(G); Γ′ ⊢ +D(B) @ n ′. It must be the case that
Γ′ = D(Γ)+,+D(A)@n,D(∆1)
−,−D(A)@n,D(∆2)
− for some ∆1 and ∆2. This sequent
is then derivable as follows:
D(G) ⊢ n 4∗+ n
Refl
D(G);D(Γ)+,D(∆1)
−,D(∆2)
−,−D(B) @ n′,+D(A) @ n ⊢ +D(A) @ n
Ax
D(G);D(Γ)+,+A@ n,D(∆1)
−,D(∆2)
−,−B @ n′ ⊢ +D(A) @ n
Exchange
D(G);D(Γ)+,+D(A) @ n,D(∆1)
−,−D(A) @ n,D(∆2)
− ⊢ +D(B) @ n′
Left-to-Right
Thus, we obtain our result.
:
Case
n1Gn2
Γ,n1 : A,n2 : A ⊢G ∆
Γ,n1 : A ⊢G ∆
monL
Certainly, if n1Gn2, then n1 4+ n2 ∈ D(G). We know by the induction hypothesis
that all activations of Γ,n1 : A,n2 : A ⊢G ∆ are derivable. Suppose D(G); Γ
′ ⊢ +B @
n is an arbitrary activation. Then it must be the case that Γ′ ≡ D(Γ)+,+D(A) @
n1,+D(A) @ n2,D(∆1)
−,D(∆2)
−, where D(∆)− ≡ D(∆1)
−,−B @ n,D(∆2)
−. Now
we apply the monoL admissible rule (Lemma 4.27) to obtain D(G);D(Γ)+,+D(A) @
n1,D(∆1)
−,D(∆2)
− ⊢ +B @ n, which is an arbitrary activation of Γ,n1 : A ⊢G ∆.
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:
Case
n1Gn2
Γ ⊢G n1 : A,n2 : A,∆
Γ ⊢G n2 : A,∆
monR
If n1Gn2, then n1 4+ n2 ∈ D(G). We know by the induction hypothesis that all
activations of Γ ⊢G n1 : A,n2 : A,∆ are derivable. In particular, the activation (modulo
exchange (Lemma 4.18)) D(G);D(Γ)+,D(∆)−,−D(A)@n1 ⊢ +D(A)@n2 is derivable. It
suffices to show that D(G);D(Γ)+,D(∆)− ⊢ +D(A) @ n2. This follows from the monoR
admissible rule (Lemma 4.28). Finally, any other activation of Γ ⊢G n2 : A,∆ can be
activated into D(G);D(Γ)+,D(∆)− ⊢ +D(A) @ n2 (Lemma 4.14). Thus, we obtain our
result.
:
Case
Γ ⊢G ∆
Γ,n ′ : ⊤ ⊢G ∆
trueL
We know by the induction hypothesis that all activations of Γ ⊢G ∆ are derivable.
Suppose D(G); Γ′ ⊢ +D(A)@n is an arbitrary activation of Γ ⊢G ∆. Then it must be the
case that Γ′ = D(Γ)+,D(∆1)
−,D(∆2)
−, where D(∆)− ≡ D(∆1)
−,−D(A) @ n,D(∆2)
−.
Now by weakening (Lemma 4.13) we know D(G); Γ′,+ 〈+〉 @ n ′ ⊢ +D(A) @ n, and by
exchange (Lemma 4.18)
D(G);D(Γ)+,+ 〈+〉 @ n ′,D(∆1)
−,D(∆2)
− ⊢ +D(A) @ n, which is exactly an arbitrary
activation of Γ,n ′ : ⊤ ⊢G ∆.
:
Case
Γ ⊢G n : ⊤,∆
trueR
It suffices to show that every activation of Γ ⊢G n : ⊤,∆ is derivable. Consider
the activation D(G);D(Γ)+,D(∆)− ⊢ +D(⊤) @ n. This is easily derivable by ap-
plying the unit rule. Any other activation of Γ ⊢G n : ⊤,∆ is derivable, because
D(G);D(Γ)+,D(∆)− ⊢ +D(⊤) @ n can be activated by Lemma 4.14.
:
Case
Γ,n :⊥⊢G ∆
falseL
Suppose D(G);D(Γ)+,+D(⊥) @ n,D(∆1)
−,D(∆2)
− ⊢ +D(A) @ n ′ is an arbitrary acti-
vation of Γ,n :⊥⊢G ∆, where D(∆)
− ≡ D(∆1)
−,−D(A)@n ′,D(∆2)
−. We can easily see
that by definition D(G);D(Γ)+,+D(⊥)@n,D(∆1)
−,D(∆2)
− ⊢ +D(A)@n ′ is equivalent
to D(G);D(Γ)+,+ 〈−〉@ n,D(∆1)
−,D(∆2)
− ⊢ +D(A) @ n ′. We can derive the latter as
follows:
+ 〈−〉@ n ∈ Γ′,−D(A) @ n ′ D(G); Γ′,−D(A) @ n ′ ⊢ − 〈−〉@ n
unit
D(G);D(Γ)+,+ 〈−〉@ n,D(∆1)
−
,D(∆2)
− ⊢ +D(A) @ n ′
axCutBar
In the previous derivation Γ′ ≡ D(Γ)+,+ 〈−〉@n,D(∆1)
−,D(∆2)
−. Thus, any activation
of Γ,n :⊥⊢G ∆ is derivable.
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:
Case
Γ ⊢G ∆
Γ ⊢G n
′ :⊥,∆
falseR
We know by the induction hypothesis that all activations of Γ ⊢G ∆ are derivable. Sup-
pose D(G); Γ′ ⊢ +D(A)@n is an arbitrary activation of Γ ⊢G ∆. Then it must be the case
that Γ′ = D(Γ)+,D(∆)−. Now by weakening (Lemma 4.13) we know D(G); Γ′,−〈−〉 @
n ′ ⊢ +D(A) @ n, and by the left-to-right lemma (Lemma 4.14) D(G); Γ′,−D(A) @ n ⊢
+ 〈−〉@ n ′, which – modulo exchange – is equivalent to
D(G);D(Γ)+,D(∆)− ⊢ +D(⊥) @ n ′. Thus, we obtain our result.
:
Case
Γ,n : T1,n : T2 ⊢G ∆
Γ,n : T1 ∧ T2 ⊢G ∆
andL
We know by the induction hypothesis that all activations of Γ,n : T1,n : T2 ⊢G ∆ are
derivable. In particular, we know the following:
D(G);D(Γ)+,+D(T1) @ n,+D(T2) @ n,D(∆1)
−,D(∆2)
− ⊢ +D(A) @ n ′
where D(∆)− = D(∆1)
−,−D(A) @ n ′,D(∆2)
−. Using exchange we know
D(G);D(Γ)+,D(∆1)
−,D(∆2)
−,+D(T1)@n,+D(T2)@n ⊢ +D(A)@n
′, and by the left-
to-right lemma D(G);D(Γ)+,D(∆1)
−,D(∆2)
−,+D(T1)@ n,−D(A)@ n
′ ⊢ −D(T2)@ n,
and finally by one more application of exchange
D(G);D(Γ)+,D(∆1)
−,D(∆2)
−,−D(A) @ n ′,+D(T1) @ n ⊢ −D(T2) @ n. At this point
we know D(G);D(Γ)+,D(∆1)
−,D(∆2)
−,−D(A) @ n ′ ⊢ −D(T1) ∧+ D(T2) @ n by using
the admissible andL rule (Lemma 4.17). Now using left-to-right we know the following:
D(G);D(Γ)+,D(∆1)
−,D(∆2)
−,+D(T1) ∧+ D(T2) @ n ⊢ +D(A) @ n
′
is derivable. Lastly, by exchange D(G);D(Γ)+,+D(T1)∧+D(T2)@n,D(∆1)
−,D(∆2)
− ⊢
+D(A) @ n ′ is derivable, which is clearly an arbitrary activation of Γ,n : T1 ∧ T2 ⊢G ∆.
:
Case
Γ ⊢G n : A,∆
Γ ⊢G n : B ,∆
Γ ⊢G n : A ∧ B ,∆
andR
We know by the induction hypothesis that all activations of Γ ⊢G n : A,∆ as well as
Γ ⊢G n : B ,∆ are derivable. In particular, D(G);D(Γ)
+,D(∆)− ⊢ +D(A) @ n and
D(G);D(Γ)+,D(∆)− ⊢ +D(B) @ n are derivable. Now by applying the and rule we
obtain D(G);D(Γ)+,D(∆)− ⊢ +D(A) ∧+ D(B) @ n, which is a particular activation of
Γ ⊢G n : A ∧ B ,∆. Finally, consider any other activation, then that sequent implies
D(G);D(Γ)+,D(∆)− ⊢ +D(A) ∧+ D(B) @ n is derivable using Lemma 4.14. Thus, we
obtain our result.
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:
Case
Γ,n : A ⊢G ∆
Γ,n : B ⊢G ∆
Γ,n : A ∨ B ⊢G ∆
disjL
We know by the induction hypothesis that all activations of Γ,n : A ⊢G ∆ and Γ,n :
B ⊢G ∆ are derivable. So suppose
D(G);D(Γ)+,+D(A) @ n,D(∆′)− ⊢ +D(C ) @ n ′
and
D(G);D(Γ)+,+D(B) @ n,D(∆′)− ⊢ +D(E ) @ n ′′
are particular activations, where
D(∆)− ≡ D(∆1)
−,−D(C ) @ n ′,D(∆2)
−,−D(E ) @ n ′′,D(∆3)
−
and
D(∆′)− ≡ D(∆1)
−,D(∆2)
−,D(∆3)
−.
By exchange (Lemma 4.18) we know
D(G);D(Γ)+,D(∆′)−,+D(A) @ n ⊢ +D(C ) @ n ′
and
D(G);D(Γ)+,D(∆′)−,+D(B) @ n ⊢ +D(E ) @ n ′′.
Now by the left-to-right lemma (Lemma 4.14) we know :
D(G);D(Γ)+,D(∆′)−,−D(C ) @ n ′ ⊢ −D(A) @ n
and
D(G);D(Γ)+,D(∆′)−,−D(E ) @ n ′′ ⊢ −D(B) @ n,
and by applying weakening (and exchange) we know
D(G);D(Γ)+,D(∆′)−,−D(C ) @ n ′,−D(E ) @ n ′′ ⊢ −D(A) @ n
and
D(G);D(Γ)+,D(∆′)−,−D(C ) @ n ′,−D(E ) @ n ′′ ⊢ −D(B) @ n.
At this point we can apply the and rule to obtain
D(G);D(Γ)+,D(∆′)−,−D(C ) @ n ′,−D(E ) @ n ′′ ⊢ −D(A) ∧− D(B) @ n,
to which we can apply the left-to-right lemma to and obtain
D(G);D(Γ)+,D(∆′)−,−D(E )@ n ′′,+D(A)∧−D(B)@n ⊢ +D(C )@ n
′. Finally, we can
apply exchange again to obtain
D(G);D(Γ)+,+D(A) ∧− D(B) @ n,D(∆
′)−,−D(E ) @ n ′′ ⊢ +D(C ) @ n ′,
which – modulo exchange – is an arbitrary activation of Γ,n : A ∨ B ⊢G ∆. Thus, we
obtain our result.
:
Case
Γ ⊢G x : T1, x : T2,∆
Γ ⊢G x : T1 ∨ T2,∆
disjR
This case is similar to the case of andR case, except, it makes use of the andBar rule.
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:
Case
n1Gn2
Γ ⊢G n2 : T1,∆
Γ,n2 : T2 ⊢G ∆
Γ,n1 : T1 ⊃ T2 ⊢G ∆
impL
We know by the induction hypothesis that all activations of Γ ⊢G n2 : T1,∆ and Γ,n2 :
T2 ⊢G ∆ are derivable. In particular, we know D(G);D(Γ)
+,D(∆)− ⊢ +D(T1) @ n2 is
derivable, and so is D(G);D(Γ)+,D(∆)− ⊢ −D(T2) @ n2. The latter being derivable
by applying the induction hypothesis followed by exchange (Lemma 4.18) and the left-
to-right lemma (Lemma 4.14). We know n1Gn2 by assumption and so by Lemma 4.30
D(G) ⊢ n1 4
∗
+ n2. Thus, by applying the impBar rule we obtain D(G);D(Γ)
+,D(∆)− ⊢
−D(T1)→+ D(T2)@n1. At this point we can apply left-to-right to the previous sequent
and obtain an activation of Γ,n1 : T1 ⊃ T2 ⊢G ∆. Any other activations can be used
to derive D(G);D(Γ)+,D(∆)− ⊢ +D(T1)@ n2 and D(G);D(Γ)
+,D(∆)− ⊢ −D(T2) @ n2,
and thus, thus we obtain our result.
:
Case
n2 6∈ |G|, |Γ|, |∆|
Γ,n2 : T1 ⊢G∪{(n1,n2)} n2 : T2,∆
Γ ⊢G n1 : T1 ⊃ T2,∆
impR
This case follows the same pattern as the previous cases. We know by the induction
hypothesis that all activations of Γ,n2 : T1 ⊢G∪{(n1,n2)} n2 : T2,∆ are derivable. In
particular, D(G),n1 4+ n2;D(Γ)
+,+D(T1) @ n2,D(∆)
− ⊢ +D(T2) @ n2 is derivable.
By exchange (Lemma 4.18)
D(G),n1 4+ n2;D(Γ)
+,D(∆)−,+D(T1)@n2 ⊢ +D(T2)@n2 is derivable, and by apply-
ing the imp rule we obtain D(G);D(Γ)+,D(∆)− ⊢ +D(T1) →+ D(T2) @ n1, which is a
particular activation of Γ ⊢G n1 : T1 ⊃ T2,∆. Note that in the previous application of
imp we use the fact that if n2 6∈ |G|, |Γ|, |∆|, then n2 6∈ |D(G)|, |D(Γ)
+,D(∆)−|. Lastly,
any other activation of Γ ⊢G n1 : T1 ⊃ T2,∆ implies D(G);D(Γ)
+,D(∆)− ⊢ +D(T1)→+
D(T2) @ n1 is derivable by the left-to-right lemma, and hence is derivable.
:
Case
n1 6∈ |G|, |Γ|, |∆|
Γ,n1 : T1 ⊢G∪{(n1,n2)} n1 : T2,∆
Γ,n2 : T1 ≺ T2 ⊢G ∆
subL
We know by the induction hypothesis that all activation of
Γ,n1 : T1 ⊢G∪{(n1,n2)} n1 : T2,∆ are derivable. In particular,
D(G),n1 4+ n2;D(Γ)
+,+D(T1)@ n1,D(∆)
− ⊢ +D(T2)@ n1 is derivable. By exchange
(Lemma 4.18) D(G),n1 4+ n2;D(Γ)
+,D(∆)−,+D(T1)@n1 ⊢ +D(T2)@n1 is derivable.
Now by the left-to-right lemma we know
D(G),n1 4+ n2;D(Γ)
+,D(∆)−,−D(T2) @ n1 ⊢ −D(T1) @ n1, and by assumption we
know y 6∈ |G|, |Γ|, |∆|, which implies
n1 6∈ |D(G)|, |D(Γ)
+,D(∆)−| is derivable. Thus, by applying the imp rule we know
D(G),n1 4+ n2;D(Γ)
+,D(∆)− ⊢ −D(T2) →− D(T1) @ n2 is derivable. Clearly, this
is a particular activation of Γ,n2 : T1 ≺ T2 ⊢G ∆, and any other activation implies
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D(G),n1 4+ n2;D(Γ)
+,D(∆)− ⊢ −D(T2) →− D(T1) @ n2 is derivable by the left-to-
right lemma, and hence are derivable.
:
Case
n1Gn2
Γ ⊢G n1 : T1,∆
Γ,n1 : T2 ⊢G ∆
Γ ⊢G n2 : T1 ≺ T2,∆
subR
This case follows in the same way as the case for impL, except the particular activation
of Γ,n1 : T2 ⊢G ∆ has to have the active formulas such that the rule impBar can be
applied.
A.6. Proof of Lemma 4.36. This is a proof by induction on the assumed typing deriva-
tion.
:
Case
G ⊢ n 4∗p n
′
G; Γ, p A@ n,Γ′ ⊢ p A@ n ′
ax
We only show the case when p = +, because the case when p = − is similar. By the defini-
tion of the L-translation we must show that the L-sequent L(Γ)+,n : L(A), L(Γ′)+ ⊢L(G)
L(Γ)−,n ′ : L(A), L(Γ′)− is derivable. Since we know that for any n1,n2 ∈ |n 4p′
n, G|, |Γ|, if G ⊢ n1 4
∗
p′ n2, then n1 4p′ n2 ∈ G, it must be the case that n 4+ n
′ ∈ G,
and thus, nL(G)n ′. At this point we may apply the L inference rule monL using this
fact. Therefore, we have derived L(Γ)+,n : L(A),n ′ : L(A), L(Γ′)+ ⊢L(G) L(Γ)
−,n ′ :
L(A), L(Γ′)−, and then we may complete the derivation by applying the L inference rule
hyp.
:
Case
G; Γ ⊢ p 〈p〉@ n
unit
Suppose p = +. Then by the definition of the L-translation we must derive
L(Γ)+ ⊢L(G) n : ⊤, L(Γ)
−,
but this follows by simply applying the L inference rule trueR.
Suppose p = −. Then by the definition of the L-translation we must derive
L(Γ)+,n : ⊥ ⊢L(G) L(Γ)
−,
but this follows by simply applying the L inference rule falseL.
:
Case
G; Γ ⊢ p A@ n G; Γ ⊢ p B @ n
G; Γ ⊢ p (A ∧p B) @ n
and
Suppose p = +. Then by the induction hypothesis we know the following:
L(Γ)+ ⊢L(G) n : A, L(Γ)
−
L(Γ)+ ⊢L(G) n : B , L(Γ)
−
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By the definition of the L-translation we must show that
L(Γ)+ ⊢L(G) n : A ∧ B , L(Γ)
−.
This easily follows by applying the L inference rule andR.
Now suppose p = −. Then by the induction hypothesis we know the following:
L(Γ)+,n : A ⊢L(G) L(Γ)
−
L(Γ)+,n : B ⊢L(G) L(Γ)
−
By the definition of the L-translation we must show that
L(Γ)+,n : A ∨ B ⊢L(G) L(Γ)
−.
This easily follows by applying the L inference rule disjL.
:
Case
G; Γ ⊢ p Ad @ n
G; Γ ⊢ p (A1 ∧p¯ A2) @ n
andBar
Suppose p = + and d = 1. Then by the induction hypothesis we know the following:
L(Γ)+ ⊢L(G) n : L(A1), L(Γ)
−
Then by the L admissible inference rule weakR (Lemma 4.33) we know the following:
L(Γ)+ ⊢L(G) n : L(A1),n : L(A2), L(Γ)
−
Thus, we obtain our result that L(Γ)+ ⊢L(G) n : L(A1) ∨ L(A2), L(Γ)
− is derivable by
applying the L inference rule disjR. The case for when d = 2 is similar.
If p = − then the result follows similarly to the case when p = + except that the
derivation is a result of applying the rule andL after applying the admissible L inference
rule weakL to the induction hypothesis.
:
Case
n ′ 6∈ |G|, |Γ|
(G,n 4p n
′); Γ, p A@ n ′ ⊢ p B @ n ′
G; Γ ⊢ p (A→p B) @ n
imp
Suppose p = +. Then by the induction hypothesis we know the following:
L(Γ)+,n ′ : L(A) ⊢(L(G)∪{(n,n′)}) n
′ : L(B), L(Γ)−
We know by assumption that n ′ 6∈ |G|, |Γ|, and hence, n ′ 6∈ |L(G)|, |L(Γ)+|, |L(Γ)−| by
the definition of the L translation. Therefore, our result follows by simply applying the
L inference rule impR.
Suppose p = −. This case follows similarly to the case when p = +, but we conclude
with the L inference rule subL.
:
Case
G ⊢ n 4∗p¯ n
′
G; Γ ⊢ p¯ A@ n ′ G; Γ ⊢ p B @ n ′
G; Γ ⊢ p (A→p¯ B) @ n
impBar
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Suppose p = +. Then by the induction hypothesis we know the following:
i. L(Γ)+,n ′ : L(A) ⊢L(G) L(Γ)
−
ii. L(Γ)+ ⊢L(G) n
′ : L(B), L(Γ)−
Furthermore, we know for any n1,n2 ∈ |n 4p′ n, G|, |Γ| if G ⊢ n1 4
∗
p′ n2, then
n1 4p′ n2 ∈ G, and we know by assumption that G ⊢ n 4
∗
− n
′, and thus, n 4− n
′ ∈ G,
hence, n ′L(G)n by the definition of the L-translation.
It suffices to show that L(Γ)+ ⊢L(G) n : L(B) ≺ L(A), L(Γ)
−, but this follows by applying
the L inference rule subR using i and ii from above as well as the fact that we know
n ′L(G)n.
Now suppose p = −. Similar to the case when p = +, but we conclude with applying
the L inference rule impL, and the induction hypothesis provides the following:
i. L(Γ)+ ⊢L(G) n
′ : L(A), L(Γ)−
ii. L(Γ)+,n ′ : L(B) ⊢L(G) L(Γ)
−.
:
Case
p B @ n ′ ∈ (Γ, p¯ A@ n) G; Γ, p¯ A@ n ⊢ p¯ B @ n ′
G; Γ ⊢ p A@ n
axCut
Suppose p = +. Then by the induction hypothesis we know the following:
L(Γ)+,n ′ : L(B) ⊢L(G) n : L(A), L(Γ)
−
Now we know that p B @ n ′ ∈ (Γ, p¯ A@ n), and hence, n ′ : L(B) ∈ L(Γ)+, which implies
we know the following:
L(Γ1)
+,n ′ : L(B), L(Γ2)
+,n ′ : L(B) ⊢L(G) n : L(A), L(Γ)
−
Therefore, by applying the admissible L inference rule contrL we know the following:
L(Γ1)
+,n ′ : L(B), L(Γ2)
+ ⊢L(G) n : L(A), L(Γ)
−
This is equivalent to our result:
L(Γ)+ ⊢L(G) n : L(A), L(Γ)
−
Suppose p = −. Then by the induction hypothesis we know the following:
L(Γ)+,n ′ : L(A) ⊢L(G) n : L(B), L(Γ)
−
This case now follows similarly to the previous case by exposing n : L(B) in L(Γ)−, and
then using contraction on the right.
:
Case
p¯ B @ n ′ ∈ (Γ, p¯ A@ n) G; Γ, p¯ A@ n ⊢ p B @ n ′
G; Γ ⊢ p A@ n
axCutBar
This case is similar to the previous case except in the case when p = + we use contraction
on the right, and then when p = − we use contraction on the left.
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A.7. Proof of Lemma 4.42: DIL-validity is L-validity. Suppose JG; Γ ⊢ p A @ nKN
holds for some Kripke model (W,R, V ) and node interpreter N on |G|, and p = +. It suffices
to show that L(Γ)+ ⊢L(G) n : L(A), L(Γ)
− is L-valid. By the definition of the interpretation
of DIL-sequents (Definition 4.11) we know that
if JGKN and JΓKN , then pJAK(N n)
Now to show that L(Γ)+ ⊢L(G) n : L(A), L(Γ)
− is L-valid we must show that at least one of
the following does not hold:
i. for any n1L(G)n2, R (N n1) (N n2)
ii. for any n : L(B) ∈ L(Γ)+, JL(B)KN n
iii. for any n : L(B) ∈ (n : L(A), L(Γ)−),¬JL(B)KN n
So if neither JGKN or JΓKN hold, then neither of i or ii will hold. Thus, L(Γ)
+ ⊢L(G) n :
L(A), L(Γ)− is L-valid.
So assume JGKN or JΓKN hold. Then both i and ii are satisfied by Lemma 4.40. However,
we now know +JAK(N n) = JAK(N n) holds, and hence by Lemma 4.40, iii does not hold.
Therefore, L(Γ)+ ⊢L(G) n : L(A), L(Γ)
− is L-valid.
Now suppose p = −. It suffices to show that L(Γ)+,n : L(A) ⊢L(G) L(Γ)
− is L-valid.
However, notice that we must show that at least one of the following does not hold:
i. for any n1L(G)n2, R (N n1) (N n2)
ii. for any n : L(B) ∈ (L(Γ)+,n : L(A)), JL(B)KN n
iii. for any n : L(B) ∈ L(Γ)−,¬JL(B)KN n
However, notice that ii will allows be false in this case, because if JGKN or JΓKN hold, then
we know −JAK(N n) = ¬JAK(N n), which implies that ¬JL(A)K(N n). Therefore, L(Γ)
+,n :
L(A) ⊢L(G) L(Γ)
− is L-valid.
Appendix B. Proofs from Section 5: Dualized Type Theory
B.1. Proof of Lemma 5.1. Due to the size of the derivation in question we give several
derivations that combine to form the typing derivation of
G; Γ ⊢ case t of x .t1, x .t2 : p C @ n.
The typing derivation begins using cut as follows:
D0 D1
G; Γ ⊢ ν z0.(ν z1.(ν z2.t ·(z1, z2))·(ν x .t2·z0))·(ν x .t1·z0) : +C @ n cut
Then the remainder of the derivation depends on the following sub-derivations:
D0 :
D3 D4
G; Γ, z0 : −C @ n ⊢ ν z1.(ν z2.t ·(z1, z2))·(ν x .t2·z0) : +A@ n cut
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D1 :
D2 G; Γ, z0 : −C @ n, x : +A@ n ⊢ z0 : −C @ n
ax
G; Γ, z0 : −C @ n ⊢ ν x .t1·z0 : −A@ n cut
D2 :
G; Γ, x : +A@ n ⊢ t1 : +C @ n
G; Γ, z0 : −C @ n, x : +A@ n ⊢ t1 : +C @ n
weakening
D4 :
D5 G; Γ, z0 : −C @ n, z1 : −A@ n, x : +B @ n ⊢ z0 : −C @ n
G; Γ, z0 : −C @ n, z1 : −A@ n ⊢ ν x .t2·z0 : −B @ n cut
D3 :
D6 D7
G; Γ, z0 : −C @ n, z1 : −A@ n ⊢ ν z2.t ·(z1, z2) : +B @ n cut
D5 :
G; Γ, x : +B @ n ⊢ t2 : +C @ n
G; Γ, z0 : −C @ n, z1 : −A@ n, x : +B @ n ⊢ t2 : +C @ n
weakening
D6 :
G; Γ ⊢ t : + (A ∧− B) @ n
G; Γ, z0 : −C @ n, z1 : −A@ n, z2 : −B @ n ⊢ t : + (A ∧− B) @ n
weakening
D7 :
D8 D9
G; Γ, z0 : −C @ n, z1 : −A@ n, z2 : −B @ n ⊢ (z1, z2) : − (A ∧− B) @ n
and
D8 :
G; Γ, z0 : −C @ n, z1 : −A@ n, z2 : −B @ n ⊢ z1 : −A@ n
ax
D9 :
G; Γ, z0 : −C @ n, z1 : −A@ n, z2 : −B @ n ⊢ z2 : −B @ n
ax
Appendix C. Proofs from Section 6: Metatheory of DTT
C.1. Proof of Lemma 6.2: Node Renaming. This is a proof by induction on the
assumed reachability derivation. Throughout each case suppose we have nodes n4 and n5.
:
Case
G,n1 4p n3, G
′ ⊢ n1 4
∗
p n3
ax
Trivial.
:
Case
G1, G2 ⊢ n 4
∗
p n
refl
Trivial.
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:
Case
G1, G2 ⊢ n1 4
∗
p n
′ G1, G2 ⊢ n
′
4
∗
p n3
G1, G2 ⊢ n1 4
∗
p n3
trans
By the induction hypothesis we know that for any nodes n ′4 and n
′
5 we have
[n ′4/n
′
5]G1, [n
′
4/n
′
5]G2 ⊢ [n
′
4/n
′
5]n1 4
∗
p [n
′
4/n
′
5]n
′, and for any nodes n ′′4 and n
′′
5 we
have [n ′′4 /n
′′
5 ]G1, [n
′′
4 /n
′′
5 ]G2 ⊢ [n
′′
4 /n
′′
5 ]n
′ 4∗p [n
′′
4 /n
′′
5 ]n3. Choose n4 for n
′
4 and n
′′
4
and n5 for n
′
5 and n
′′
5 to obtain [n4/n5]G1, [n4/n5]G2 ⊢ [n4/n5]n1 4
∗
p [n4/n5]n
′ and
[n4/n5]G1, [n4/n5]G2 ⊢ [n4/n5]n
′ 4∗p [n4/n5]n3. Finally, this case follows by reapplying
the rule to the previous two facts.
:
Case
G ⊢ n ′ 4∗p¯ n
G ⊢ n 4∗p n
′ flip
Similar to the previous case.
C.2. Proof of Lemma 6.3: Node Substitution for Reachability. This is a proof by
induction on the form of the assumed reachability derivation. Throughout the following
cases we assume G,G′ ⊢ n1 4
∗
p1
n3 holds.
:
Case
G1,n4 4p n5, G2 ⊢ n4 4
∗
p n5
ax
Suppose G1,n4 4p n5, G2 = G,n1 4p1 n2, G
′. Then either n1 4p1 n2 ∈ G1, n1 4p1
n2 ∈ G2, or n1 4p1 n2 ≡ n4 4p n5. Suppose n1 4p1 n2 ∈ G1, then G1 =
G′1,n1 4p n2, G
′′
1 . Then it is easy to see that [n3/n2]G
′
1, [n3/n2]G
′′
1 , [n3/n2]n4 4p
[n3/n2]n5, [n3/n2]G2 ⊢ [n3/n2]n4 4
∗
p [n3/n2]n5 is derivable by applying Ax. The case
where n1 4p1 n2 ∈ G2 is similar.
Now suppose n1 4p1 n2 ≡ n4 4p n5. Then we know by assumption that
G1,n1 4p n2, G2 ⊢ n1 4
∗
p n2
ax
Then it suffices to show [n3/n2]G1, [n3/n2]G2 ⊢ [n3/n2]n1 4
∗
p [n3/n2]n2, which is equiv-
alent to [n3/n2]G1, [n3/n2]G2 ⊢ [n3/n2]n1 4
∗
p n3. Now if n1 is equivalent to n2, then
[n3/n2]G1, [n3/n2]G2 ⊢ [n3/n2]n1 4
∗
p n3 holds by reflexivity, and if n1 is distinct from
n2, then [n3/n2]G1, [n3/n2]G2 ⊢ [n3/n2]n1 4
∗
p n3 is equivalent to [n3/n2]G1, [n3/n2]G2 ⊢
n1 4
∗
p n3. We know by assumption that G,G
′ ⊢ n1 4
∗
p1
n3 holds, which is equivalent to
G1, G2 ⊢ n1 4
∗
p n3. Now if n3 is equal to n2, then [n3/n2]G1, [n3/n2]G2 ⊢ n1 4
∗
p n3 is
equivalent to G1, G2 ⊢ n1 4
∗
p n3. So suppose n3 is distinct from n2, then by Lemma 6.2
we know [n3/n2]G1, [n3/n2]G2 ⊢ n1 4
∗
p n3.
:
Case
G,n1 4p1 n2, G
′ ⊢ n 4∗p n
refl
Trivial.
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:
Case
G,n1 4p1 n2, G
′ ⊢ n4 4
∗
p n6 G ⊢ n6 4
∗
p n5
G,n1 4p1 n2, G
′ ⊢ n4 4
∗
p n5
trans
This case by applying the induction to each premise, and then reapplying the rule.
:
Case
G,n1 4p1 n2, G
′ ⊢ n5 4
∗
p¯ n4
G,n1 4p1 n2, G
′ ⊢ n4 4
∗
p n5
flip
This case holds by applying the induction hypothesis to the premise, and then reapplying
the rule.
C.3. Proof of Lemma 6.4: Node Substitution for Typing. This is a proof by induc-
tion on the form of the assumed typing derivation. Throughout each of the following cases
we assume G,G′ ⊢ n1 4
∗
p1
n4 holds.
:
Case
G,n1 4p1 n2, G
′ ⊢ n 4∗p n3
G,n1 4p1 n2, G
′; Γ1, y : p2A@ n,Γ2 ⊢ y : p2A@ n3
Ax
First, by node substitution for reachability (Lemma 6.3) we know
[n4/n2]G, [n4/n2]G
′ ⊢ [n4/n2]n 4
∗
p [n4/n2]n3. Thus, by applying the Ax rule we may
derive [n4/n2]G, [n4/n2]G
′; [n4/n2]Γ1, y : p2A@[n4/n2]n, [n4/n2]Γ2 ⊢ y : p2A@[n4/n2]n3.
:
Case
G,n1 4p1 n2, G
′; Γ ⊢ triv : p2 〈p2〉@ n3
Unit
Trivial.
:
Case
G,n1 4p1 n2; Γ ⊢ t1 : p2A1 @ n3 G,n1 4p1 n2; Γ ⊢ t2 : p2A2 @ n3
G,n1 4p1 n2; Γ ⊢ (t1, t2) : p2 (A1 ∧p2 A2) @ n3
And
This case holds by applying the induction hypothesis to each premise, and then reapply-
ing the rule.
:
Case
G,n1 4p1 n2; Γ ⊢ t
′ : p2 Ad @ n3
G,n1 4p1 n2; Γ ⊢ ind t
′ : p2 (A1 ∧p¯2 A2) @ n3
AndBar
This case holds by applying the induction hypothesis to the premise, and then reapplying
the rule.
:
Case
n ′ 6∈ |G,n1 4p1 n2, G
′|, |Γ|
(G,n1 4p1 n2, G
′,n3 4p2 n
′); Γ, x : p2A1 @ n
′ ⊢ t ′ : p2A2 @ n
′
G,n1 4p1 n2, G
′; Γ ⊢ λx .t ′ : p2 (A1 →p2 A2) @ n3
Imp
First, if n ′ 6∈ |G,n1 4p1 n2, G
′|, |Γ|, then n ′ 6∈ |G,G′|, |Γ|. Furthermore, we know
that [n4/n2]n
′ 6∈ |[n4/n2]G, [n4/n2]G
′|, |[n4/n2]Γ|, because we know n
′ is distinct from
n2 by assumption, and if n
′ is equal to n4, then n
′ 6∈ |G,n1 4p1 n2, G
′|, |Γ| implies
that n1 must also be n4, because we know by assumption that G,G
′ ⊢ n1 4
∗
p1
n4,
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which could only be derived by reflexivity since n ′ 6∈ |G,G′|, |Γ|, but we know by as-
sumption that n ′ 6∈ |G,n1 4p1 n2, G
′|, |Γ|, which implies that n ′ must be distinct
from n1, and hence a contradiction, thus n
′ cannot be n4. Therefore, we know n
′ 6∈
|[n4/n2]G, [n4/n2]G
′|, |[n4/n2]Γ|.
By the induction hypothesis we know
([n4/n2]G, [n4/n2]G′, [n4/n2]n3 4p2 [n4/n2]n
′); [n4/n2]Γ, x : p2 A1 @ [n4/n2]n′ ⊢ t ′ : p2 A2 @ [n4/n2]n′ ,
which is equivalent to
([n4/n2]G, [n4/n2]G
′, [n4/n2]n3 4p2 n
′); [n4/n2]Γ, x : p2A1 @ n
′ ⊢ t ′ : p2A2 @ n
′.
Finally, this case follows by applying the Imp rule using
n ′ 6∈ |[n4/n2]G, [n4/n2]G
′|, |[n4/n2]Γ| and the previous fact.
:
Case
G,n1 4p1 n2, G
′ ⊢ n3 4
∗
p¯2
n ′
G,n1 4p1 n2, G
′; Γ ⊢ t1 : p¯2A1 @ n
′ G,n1 4p1 n2, G
′; Γ ⊢ t2 : p2A2 @ n
′
G,n1 4p1 n2, G
′; Γ ⊢ 〈t1, t2〉 : p2 (A1 →p¯2 A2) @ n3
ImpBar
We now by assumption that G,G′ ⊢ n1 4
∗
p1
n4 holds. So by node substitution for reach-
ability (Lemma 6.3) we know [n4/n2]G, [n4/n2]G
′ ⊢ [n4/n2]n3 4
∗
p¯2
[n4/n2]n
′. Now by
the induction hypothesis we know [n4/n2]G, [n4/n2]G
′; [n4/n2]Γ ⊢ t1 : p¯2A1 @ [n4/n2]n
′
and
[n4/n2]G, [n4/n2]G
′; [n4/n2]Γ ⊢ t2 : p2A2@[n4/n2]n
′. This case then follows by applying
the rule ImpBar to the previous three facts.
:
Case
G,n1 4p1 n2, G
′; Γ, y : p¯2A@ n3 ⊢ t1 : +C @ n
G,n1 4p1 n2, G
′; Γ, y : p¯2A@ n3 ⊢ t2 : −C @ n
G,n1 4p1 n2, G
′; Γ ⊢ ν x .t1·t2 : p2A@ n3 Cut
This case follows by applying the induction hypothesis to each premise, and then reap-
plying the rule.
C.4. Proof of Lemma 6.5: Substitution for Typing. This proof holds by a straight-
forward induction on the second assumed typing relation.
:
Case
G ⊢ n 4∗p n
′
G; Γ1, y : p C @ n,Γ2 ⊢ y : p C @ n
′ Ax
Trivial.
:
Case
G; Γ1 ⊢ triv : p 〈p〉@ n
Unit
Trivial.
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:
Case
G; Γ1 ⊢ t
′
1 : p A@ n G; Γ1 ⊢ t
′
2 : p B @ n
G; Γ1 ⊢ (t
′
1, t
′
2) : p (C1 ∧p C2) @ n
And
Suppose Γ1 ≡ Γ, x : p1 A @ n1,Γ
′. Then this case follows from applying the induction
hypothesis to each premise and then reapplying the rule.
:
Case
G; Γ1 ⊢ t : p Cd @ n
G; Γ1 ⊢ ind t : p (C1 ∧p¯ C2) @ n
AndBar
Suppose Γ1 ≡ Γ, x : p1 A @ n1,Γ
′. Then this case follows from applying the induction
hypothesis to the premise and then reapplying the rule.
:
Case
n ′ 6∈ |G|, |Γ1|
(G,n 4p n
′); Γ1, x : p C1 @ n
′ ⊢ t : p C2 @ n
′
G; Γ1 ⊢ λx .t : p (C1 →p C2) @ n
Imp
Similarly to the previous case.
:
Case
G ⊢ n 4∗p¯ n
′
G; Γ1 ⊢ t
′
1 : p¯ C1 @ n
′ G; Γ1 ⊢ t
′
2 : p C2 @ n
′
G; Γ1 ⊢ 〈t
′
1, t
′
2〉 : p (C1 →p¯ C2) @ n
ImpBar
Suppose Γ1 ≡ Γ, x : p1 A @ n1,Γ
′. Then this case follows from applying the induction
hypothesis to each premise and then reapplying the rule.
:
Case
G; Γ1, y : p¯ C @ n ⊢ t
′
1 : +C
′ @ n ′
G; Γ1, y : p¯ C @ n ⊢ t
′
2 : −C
′ @ n ′
G; Γ1 ⊢ ν x .t
′
1·t ′2 : p C @ n Cut
Similarly to the previous case.
C.5. Proof of Lemma 6.6: Type Preservation. This is a proof by induction on the
form of the assumed typing derivation. We only consider non-trivial cases. All the other
cases either follow directly from assumptions or are similar to the cases we provide below.
:
Case
G; Γ, x : p¯ A@ n ⊢ t1 : +B @ n
′
G; Γ, x : p¯ A@ n ⊢ t2 : −B @ n
′
G; Γ ⊢ ν x .t1·t2 : p A@ n Cut
The interesting cases are the ones where the assumed cut is a redex itself, otherwise this
case holds by the induction hypothesis. Thus, we case split on the form of this redex.
: Case Suppose ν x .t1· t2 ≡ ν x .λy .t ′1· 〈t ′2, t ′′2 〉, thus, t1 ≡ λy .t ′1 and t2 ≡ 〈t ′2, t ′′2 〉. This
then implies that B ≡ B1 →+ B2 for some B1 and B2. Then
t ≡ ν x .t1·t2 ≡ ν x .λy .t ′1·〈t ′2, t ′′2 〉 ν x .[t ′2/y ]t ′1·t ′′2 ≡ t ′.
Now by inversion we know the following:
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(1) G, (n ′ 4+ n
′′); Γ, x : p¯ A@ n, y : +B1 @ n
′′ ⊢ t ′1 : +B2 @ n
′′
for some n ′′ 6∈ |G|, |Γ, x : p¯ A@ n|
(2) G; Γ, x : p¯ A@ n ⊢ t ′2 : +B1 @ n
′′′
(3) G; Γ, x : p¯ A@ n ⊢ t ′′2 : −B2 @ n
′′′
(4) G ⊢ n ′ 4∗+ n
′′′
Using (1) and (4) we may apply node substitution for typing (Lemma 6.4) to obtain
(5) [n ′′′/n ′′]G; [n ′′′/n ′′]Γ, x : p¯ A@ n, y : +B1 @ n
′′′ ⊢ t ′1 : +B2 @ n
′′′.
Finally, by applying substitution for typing using (2) and (5) we obtain
(6) [n ′′′/n ′′]G; [n ′′′/n ′′]Γ, x : p¯ A@ n ⊢ [t ′2/y ]t
′
1 : +B2 @ n
′′′,
and since n ′′ is a fresh in G and Γ we know (6) is equivalent to
(7)G; Γ, x : p¯ A@ n ⊢ [t ′2/y ]t
′
1 : +B2 @ n
′′′.
Finally, by applying the Cut rule using (7) and (3) we obtain
G; Γ ⊢ ν x .[t ′2/y ]t
′
1·t ′′2 : p A@ n.
C.6. Proof of Lemma 6.9: SN Interpretations. For purposes of this proof and subse-
quent ones, define δ(t) to be the length of the longest reduction sequence from t to a normal
form, for t ∈ SN.
The proof of the lemma is by mutual well-founded induction on the pair (A,n), where
n is the number of the proposition in the statement of the lemma; the well-founded ordering
in question is the lexicographic combination of the structural ordering on types (for A) and
the ordering 1 > 2 > 4 > 3 (for n).
For proposition (1): assume t ∈ JAK+, and show t ∈ SN. Let x be a variable. By IH(2),
x ∈ JAK−, so by the definition of JAK+, we have
ν x .t ·x ∈ SN
This implies t ∈ SN.
For proposition (2): assume x ∈ Vars, and show x ∈ JAK−. For the latter, it suffices
to assume arbitrary y ∈ Vars and t′ ∈ JAK+c, and show ν y .t ′·x ∈ SN. We will prove this
by inner induction on δ(t′), which is defined by IH(4). By the definition of JAK+c for the
various cases of A, we see that ν y .t ′·x cannot be a redex itself, as t′ cannot be a cut. If t′
is a normal form we are done. If t  t′′, then we have t′′ ∈ JAK+c by Lemma 6.8, and we
may apply the inner induction hypothesis.
For proposition (3): assume t ∈ JAK−, and show t ∈ SN. By the definition of JAK− and
the fact that Vars ⊆ JAK+c by definition of JAK+c, we have
ν y .y ·t ∈ SN
This implies t ∈ SN as required.
For proposition (4): assume t ∈ JAK+c, and consider the following cases. If t ∈ Vars
or A ≡ 〈+〉, then t is normal and the result is immediate. So suppose A ≡ A1 →+ A2.
Then t ≡ λx.t′ for some x and t′ where for all t′′ ∈ JA1K
+, [t′′/x]t′ ∈ JA2K
+. By IH(2), the
variable x itself is in JA1K
+, so we know that t′ ≡ [x/x]t′ ∈ JA2K
+. Then by IH(1) we have
t′ ∈ SN, which implies λx.t′ ∈ SN. If A ≡ A1 →− A2, then t ≡ 〈t1, t2〉 for some t1 ∈ JA1K
−
and t2 ∈ JA2K
+. By IH(3) and IH(1), t1 ∈ SN and t2 ∈ SN, which implies 〈t1, t2〉 ∈ SN.
The cases for A ≡ A1 ∧p A2 are similar to this one.
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C.7. Proof of Theorem 6.12: Soundness. The proof is by induction on the derivation
of Γ ⊢c t : p A. We consider the two possible polarities for the conclusion of the typing
judgment separately.
:
Case
Γ, x : p A,Γ′ ⊢c x : p A
ClassAx
Since σ ∈ JΓ, x : p A,Γ′K, σ(x) ∈ JAKp as required.
:
Case
Γ ⊢c triv : + 〈+〉
ClassUnit
We have triv ∈ J〈+〉K+c by definition.
:
Case
Γ ⊢c triv : −〈−〉
ClassUnit
To prove triv ∈ J〈−〉K−, it suffices to assume arbitrary y ∈ Vars and t ∈ J〈−〉K+c, and
show ν y .t ·triv ∈ SN. By definition of J〈−〉K+c, t ∈ Vars, and then ν y .t ·triv is in
normal form.
:
Case
Γ ⊢c t1 : +A Γ ⊢c t2 : +B
Γ ⊢c (t1, t2) : +A ∧+ B
ClassAnd
By Lemma 6.11, it suffices to show (σt1, σt2) ∈ JA ∧+ BK
+c. This follows directly
from the definition of JA ∧+ BK
+c, since the IH gives us σt1 ∈ JAK
+ and σt2 ∈ JBK
+.
:
Case
Γ ⊢c t1 : −A1 Γ ⊢c t2 : −A2
Γ ⊢c (t1, t2) : −A1 ∧− A2
ClassAnd
It suffices to assume arbitrary y ∈ Vars and t′ ∈ JA1 ∧− A2K
+c, and show ν y .t ′ ·
(σ t1, σ t2) ∈ SN. If t
′ ∈ Vars, then this follows by Lemma 6.9 from the facts that
σt1 ∈ JA1K
+ and σt2 ∈ JA2K
+, which we have by the IH. So suppose t′ is of the form
ind t
′′ for some d and some t′′ ∈ JAdK
+. By the definition of SN, it suffices to show that
all one-step successors ta of the term in question are SN. The proof of this is by inner
induction on δ(t′′) + δ(σt1) + δ(σt2), which exists by Lemma 6.9, using also Lemma 6.8.
Suppose that we step to ta by stepping t
′′, σt1, or σt2. Then the result holds by the
inner IH. So consider the step
ν y .ind t
′′·(σ t1, σ t2) ν y .t ′′·σ td
We then have ν y .t ′′·σ td ∈ SN from the facts that t′′ ∈ JAdK+ and σtd ∈ JAdK−, by the
definition of JAdK
+.
:
Case
Γ ⊢c t : +Ad
Γ ⊢c ind t : +A1 ∧− A2
ClassAndBar
By Lemma 6.11, it suffices to prove ind σ t ∈ JA1 ∧− A2K
+, but by the definition of
JA1 ∧− A2K
+, this follows directly from σt ∈ JAdK
+, which we have by the IH.
46 H. EADES, A. STUMP, AND R. MCCLEEARY
:
Case
Γ ⊢c t : −Ad
Γ ⊢c ind t : −A1 ∧+ A2
ClassAndBar
To prove ind σ t ∈ JA1 ∧+ A2K
−, it suffices to assume arbitrary y ∈ Vars and t′ ∈
JA1∧+A2K
+c, and show ν y .t ′·ind σ t ∈ SN. If t′ ∈ Vars, then this follows from the fact
that σt ∈ SN, which we have by Lemma 6.9 from σt ∈ JAdK
− (which the IH gives us). So
suppose t′ is of the form (s1, s2) for some s1 ∈ JA1K
+ and s2 ∈ JA2K
+. It suffices to prove
that all one-step successors of the term in question are in SN, as we did in a previous
case above. Lemma 6.9 lets us proceed by inner induction on δ(σt)+ δ(s1)+ δ(s2), using
also Lemma 6.8. If we step σt, s1 or s2, then the result holds by inner IH. Otherwise,
we have the step
ν y .(s1, s2)·ind σ t  ν y .sd ·σ t
And this successor is in SN by the facts that sd ∈ JAdK
+ and σt ∈ JAdK
−, from the
definition of JAdK
+.
:
Case
Γ, x : +A ⊢c t : +B
Γ ⊢c λx .t : +A→+ B
ClassImp
By Lemma 6.11, it suffices to assume arbitrary y ∈ Vars and t′ ∈ JAK+, and prove
[t′/x](σt) ∈ JBK+. But this follows immediately from the IH, since [t′/x](σt) ≡ (σ[x 7→
t′])t and σ[x 7→ t] ∈ JΓ, x : +AK.
:
Case
Γ, x : −A ⊢c t : −B
Γ ⊢c λx .t : −A→− B
ClassImp
It suffices to assume arbitrary y ∈ Vars and t′ ∈ JA→− BK
+c, and show ν y .t ′·λx .σ t ∈
SN. Let us first observe that σ t ∈ SN, because by the IH, for all σ′ ∈ JΓ, x : −AK,
we have σ′t ∈ JBK−, and JBK− ⊆ SN by Lemma 6.9. We may instantiate this with
σ[x 7→ x], since by Lemma 6.9, x ∈ JAK−. Since σ t ∈ SN, we also have λx .σ t ∈ SN.
Now let us consider cases for the assumption t′ ∈ JA →− BK
+c. If t′ ∈ Vars then we
directly have ν y .t ′ ·λx .σ t ∈ SN from λx .σ t ∈ SN. So assume t′ ≡ 〈t1, t2〉 for some
t1 ∈ JAK
− and t2 ∈ JBK
+. By Lemma 6.9 again, we may reason by inner induction on
δ(t1)+ δ(t2)+ δ(σt) to show that all one-step successors of ν y .〈t1, t2〉·λx .σ t are in SN,
using also Lemma 6.8. We can see that t1, t2, and σt are structurally smaller, and hence,
if any one of them steps, then the result follows by the inner IH. So suppose we have
the step
ν y .〈t1, t2〉·λx .σ t  ν y .t2· [t1/x ](σ t)
Since t1 ∈ JAK
−, the substitution σ[x 7→ t1] is in JΓ, x : −AK. So we may apply the IH to
obtain [t1/x](σt) ≡ σ[x 7→ t1] ∈ JBK
−. Then since t2 ∈ JBK
+, we have ν y .t2· [t1/x ](σ t)
by definition of JBK+.
:
Case
Γ ⊢c t1 : −A Γ ⊢c t2 : +B
Γ ⊢c 〈t1, t2〉 : + (A→− B)
ClassImpBar
By Lemma 6.11, as in previous cases of positive typing, it suffices to prove 〈σ t1, σ t2〉 ∈
JA →− BK
+c. By the definition of JA →− BK
+c, this follows directly from σt1 ∈ JAK
−
and σt2 ∈ JBK
+, which we have by the IH.
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:
Case
Γ ⊢c t1 : +A Γ ⊢c t2 : −B
Γ ⊢c 〈t1, t2〉 : − (A→+ B)
ClassImpBar
It suffices to assume arbitrary y ∈ Vars and t′ ∈ JA →+ BK
+c, and show ν y .t ′ ·
〈σ t1, σ t2〉 ∈ SN. By the IH, we have σt1 ∈ JAK
+ and σt2 ∈ JBK
−, and hence σt1 ∈ SN
and σt2 ∈ SN by Lemma 6.9. If t
′ ∈ Vars, then these facts are sufficient to show the
term in question is in SN. So suppose t′ ≡ λx.t3, for some x ∈ Vars and t
′′ such that
for all t4 ∈ JAK
+, [t4/x]t3 ∈ JBK
+. By similar reasoning as in a previous case, we have
t3 ∈ SN. So we may proceed by inner induction on δ(t1)+ δ(t2)+ δ(t3) to show that all
one-step successors of ν y .λx .t3·〈σ t1, σ t2〉 are in SN, using also Lemma 6.8. We can see
that t3, σt1, and σt2 are structurally smaller, and hence, if anyone of them steps, then
the result follows by the inner IH. So consider this step:
ν y .λx .t3·〈σ t1, σ t2〉 ν y .[σ t1/x ]t3·σ t2
Since we have that σt1 ∈ JAK
+, the assumption about substitution instances of t3 gives
us that [σt1/x]t3 ∈ JBK
+, which is then sufficient to conclude ν y .[σ t1/x ]t3·σ t2 ∈ SN
by the definition of JBK+.
:
Case
Γ, x : −A ⊢c t1 : +B Γ, x : −A ⊢c t2 : −B
Γ ⊢c ν x .t1·t2 : +A ClassCut
It suffices to assume arbitrary y ∈ Vars and t′ ∈ JAK−, and show ν y .(ν x .σ t1 ·σ t2)·
t ′ ∈ SN. By the IH and part 2 of Lemma 6.9, we know that σt1 ∈ JBK
+ and σt2 ∈
JBK−. By Lemma 6.9 again, we have t′ ∈ SN, σt1 ∈ SN, and σt2 ∈ SN. So we
may reason by induction on δ(t′) + δ(σt1) + δ(σt2) to show that all one-step successors
of ν y .(ν x .σ t1 ·σ t2)· t ′ are in SN, using also Lemma 6.8. We can see that t′, σt1,
and σt2 are structurally smaller, and hence, if any one of them steps, then the result
follows by the inner IH. The only possible other reduction is by the RBetaL reduction
rule (Figure 8). And then, since t′ ∈ JAK−, we may apply the IH to conclude that
[t′/x](σt1) ∈ JBK
+ and [t′/x](σt2) ∈ JBK
−. By the definition of ∈ JBK+, this suffices to
prove ν y .[t ′/x ]σ t1· [t ′/x ]σ t2 ∈ SN, as required.
:
Case
Γ, x : −A ⊢c t1 : +B Γ, x : −A ⊢c t2 : −B
Γ ⊢c ν x .t1·t2 : −A ClassCut
It suffices to consider arbitrary y ∈ Vars and t′ ∈ JAK+c, and show ν y .t ′·(ν x .σ t1·σ t2) ∈
SN. By the IH and part 2 of Lemma 6.9, we have σt1 ∈ JBK
+ and σt2 ∈ JBK
−, which
implies σt1 ∈ SN and σt2 ∈ SN by Lemma 6.9 again. We proceed by inner induction
on δ(t′) + δ(σt1) + δ(σt2), using Lemma 6.8, to show that all one-step successors of
ν y .t ′·(ν x .σ t1·σ t2) are in SN. We can see that t′, σt1, and σt2 are structurally smaller,
and hence, if any one of them steps, then the result holds by inner IH. The only other
reduction possible is by RBetaR, since t′ cannot be a cut term by the definition of
JAK+c. In this case, the IH gives us [t′/x]σt1 ∈ JBK
+ and [t′/x]σt2 ∈ JBK
−, and we then
have ν y .[t ′/x ]σ t1· [t ′/x ]σ t2 ∈ SN by the definition of JBK+.
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